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ABSTRACT 
This paper first develops criteria by which courts can 
distin&uish between product related risks that profit maximizing firms 
can and cannot be expected to discover. It then argues that imposing 
the former -- "knowable" -- set of risks on firms reduces accident 
costs and creates no problems that corporate and bankruptcy law cannot 
adequately solve. In contrast, imposing the latter -- "remote" -- set 
of risks has no affect on reducing accident costs and tends to produce 
unsolvable problems of the kind that characterize the current asbestos 
cases. The paper concludes by arguing that courts are wrong to create 
these problems because the victims of remote risks lack a tenable 
distributional or moral claim to have private firms reimburse them. 
Products Liabili ty, Corporate S tructure and Bankrupt cy: 
Toxic Substances and the Remote R isk Relationship 
Alan Schwartz• 
This paper addresses the interaction of three seemingly 
unrelated legal issues . Each of these is sue s within i t s  respective 
field of law is minor . The i r  intersection, however, has posed a 
problem for our legal sys t em that is of overwhelming magnitude. The 
three issues are : ( 1) In produc t s  liabil ity law, should firms be made 
to bear risks that are difficult to for esee? If no o ne knew that 
widge ts cause scr ofula but they do, should widge t manufac tur ers be 
liable to scrofula victims ?  ( 2) I n  corporate law, t o  what extent 
should limi ted liabil ity isolate firm owners from products l iabil ity 
victims ?  Can Company X create a subsidiary to produce dangerous 
products and escape liability for th e resultant inj ur ies? ( 3) In 
bankruptcy law. at least after 197 9, can persons exposed to dangerous 
substances assert claims in the manufac tur er ' s  bankruptcy if th ei r 
injuries had not ma terialized by th e n .  If Smi th purchases a drug made 
by Company X in 1980, Company X file s a bankruptcy pe tition in 1981, 
and the drug some times causes inj ury to users years after inge stion, 
may a so far healthy Smi th assert a claim in X's  ba nkruptcy?1 
These sleepy, se emingly unrelated i s sues rece ntly have 
a t tracted at tent ion because they turn out to be linked in the " toxic 
ri sk" context . Toxic risks have four salient charac teristics : ( i )  
The subst ance s that create them are nei ther defec tively made nor 
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designed, but cause harm because of their ch emical nature : they 
cannot do good wi thout also doing bad ; ( i i )  The harms often 
materialize years or decade s after persons are ini tially exposed ; 
( ii i )  The exis t ence and extent of the harms are di fficult to predi c t ; 
some substance s turn out to be toxic while others do not; ( iv )  The 
harms measured in dollars can be large in relation to the value of the 
firms that sell toxic substanc e s, because many people are vulnerable 
to them . 2 
The three legal is sue s are rela ted to each o ther in the toxic 
risk context because of an obvious but overlooked fac t : r isks that 
are fully anticipated or minor seldom cause concern to firms or to the 
law . Toxic risks, however, are hard to anticipate and often maj or. 
For example, the Johns-Manville company now faces tor t claims that 
exceed its value as a firm . This has led i t  into bankruptcy and to 
consider transferring i t s  asbestos related activities to a newly 
created subsidiary. 3 These seem poor substi tutes for full insurance. 
Hence, Johns-Manville ' s  current plight may have resulted from its 
failure to foresee the full extent of the harm that asbestos could 
cause . The asbe stos cases thus raise trouble some corpor ate and 
bankruptcy law problems because of products l iabilty law ' s  prior 
resolution ; the cour ts, that is, seemingly have impo sed an 
unanticipated l iabil ity on the asbe stos firms . 
If the firms should have anticipa ted the asbe stos risk, the 
problems are the ne ce ssary price of encouraging firms to discover 
harms, and of compensa ting vict ims for firm misbehavior . But suppose 
that private firms would not normally discover the full extent of 
risks such as this . Then several interesting que stions arise: Is it 
po ssible for courts to identify with ac ceptable precision those risks 
that firms would not discover? If so , should cour ts make f irms be ar 
such risks ? Do the present strains in corporate and bankruptcy law 
tr ace to products liabili ty law rules that make firms bear risks they 
would not discover ? And i f  so , how s trongly should the strains count 
agai nst those rules ?  These que stions are this paper ' s  subj ect . 
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Part I define s  a "remote" risk as the risk that a product is 
more dangerous than a firm would predict had it done the cost­
effective amount of research into safety . A legal rule would impose 
remo te r :isks on firms if it  held them liable whenever their products 
turned out to be les s  safe than exp ec ted , and even though the firms 
had researched appropr iately and warned on the basis of what that 
research disclosed . To adop t  such a rule , Par t I argue s ,  raises a 
fai rne s s  concern because the rule would requi re firms to warn about 
danger levels that the firms could not be expected to dis cover . A 
"knowable" risk is the risk that a product is as dangerous ( or less 
so ) as a firm would predict on the basis of do ing the cost-effective 
amount of rese arch . Par t I go es on to derive criteria that would
enable cour ts to distinguish be tween remo te and knowable risks with 
acceptable ac curacy . Part II next sh ows that to hold firms liable
only for fail ing to warn of knowable risks -- ;i,_ . � . , for fail ing to 
disclose what cost-effective research would reveal -- raises corporate 
and bankruptcy problems that current law largely solve s ; relatively 
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minor reforms could solve the rest . In contrast , imposing r emote 
risks on firms can create difficulties bo th for the firms and for the 
vic tims that corporate and bankruptcy law canno t  ease , as these laws 
now exist or could be made to exis t . 4 The fairne s s  concern with 
impo sing remote risks that Part I raise s , toge ther with the 
difficulties that Part II identifie s , suggest that courts should no t 
require firms to bear remote risks unles s  they have compelling 
instrumental or justice reasons to do so . But Part III argues that no 
one could plausibly have such reasons ; rather , the victims of remo te 
risks have only a humani tarian claim to relief that society should 
mee t , bu t not through the vehicle of private law sui t s . 
Before reaching the argument , two clarifying r emarks are 
useful . First , this paper deals with the problem of remo te risks in a 
general way . I t  th erefore does no t " solve " the asbe stos case s . The 
asbe stos manufac turers may have failed to anticipate the asbestos risk 
or the full advent of strict liability in tor t , or both . I am no t 
concerne d  with legal retroactivity . 5 The full reach of strict tor t 
liability is now known while toxic risks seemingly are be coming 
wide spread , and many of them may be remote . Thus , the more impor tant 
products liabilty que stion is what cour ts should do when harms 
materialize that we re di fficult to anticipa te . I do use the asbe stos 
problem paridigmatically. but only because that problem is well-known 
and relatively easy to follow . 
Mor e impor tantly, this paper attemp t s  ideal theory , which is 
to say that it asks how courts should de cide cases supposing the 
s 
judges to be si tua ted in an otherwise just and wel l-ordered society . 
One could instead ask what cour ts should do with products l iabil ity 
problems given that our soci ety is moral ly problematic . For example, 
do and should courts take produc t s  l iabil ity cases as an oppor tuni ty 
to amel iorate insufficient progressivity in the tax system? This 
oppor tuni ty would exist were corporate shareholders as a class 
weal th ier than tort victims as a class, for then more vertical equity 
would be achieved by compensa ting vict ims through the tor t sys t em than 
through compe nsa tion plans funded from general tax revenue s .  I 
largel y ignore such analyses here . This is because the costs of 
pr agmatic solutions become apparent only in contrast to ideal ones, 
and these co sts are my real concern . Speci fical ly, th is paper asks 
what can be set agai nst the claim that were cour ts not to impose 
remote risks on firms, many toxic risk victims would receive nothing, 
when they simply must receive some thing . 
I. Remote Risks 
_!. Remote Risks and the Law
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Two products l iabil ity rule s  relating to toxic substances 
exis t . Both exculpate firms if they warn adequa tely against the harm 
that a product may cause, but they di ffer in their definition of 
adequacy . One rul e  holds a firm l iable if its warning did not 
correspond to the produc t ' s  true propensi ty to harm, as de termined on 
the basi s of hindsight after harm has occured . Under this rule, the 
firm ' s  knowledge of dangerousnes s  when it issued the warning is 
irrelevant . 6 The second rule imposes l iability only if a firm ' s  
warning did not correspond t o  what th e firm knew or should have known 
about dangerousness at the production stage . 7 This rule focuse s
attention on t h e  firm ' s  e x  ante behav ior . This paper argues that 
cour ts should use a modified version of the second rule . 
Three objec tions are made to rules that exculpate firms which 
warn . One holds that warnings about dangerousness canno t be 
efficace ous . This objec tion may rest on the difficul ty of 
representing in words what real ly is a probabil i ty distribution of 
po ssible harms, or on notions of cogni tive error--people perhaps 
cannot process or respo nd sensibly to information about differing 
likel ihoods of personal dange r . I wil l  put this objection aside, not 
because it lacks force but because, if it is true, it impeaches any 
disclosur e solution to products liabil ity problems; disclosure 
solutions are beyond this paper ' s  scope . Hence, I as sume that 
"adequate " warnings provide consumers with sufficient information 
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about harm . A second objec tion runs only to the first rule : that 
rule requires a firm's warning to match the product ' s  true degree of 
dangerousness , and the ob j ection is , that the rule may requi re a firm 
to warn when it could not have warned because it would not have known 
of the danger at production time ; requi ring a firm to do what 
seemingly canno t be done is unfai r .  The third obj ection runs only to 
the second rule , which exculpa tes a firm if its warning corresponded 
to what it should have known about dangerousness ex ante . The 
objection is , that it is impossible to apply the standard "should have 
known" in a principled way . Part IA takes up the second and third 
obj ec tions ,  beginning with the latter . 
One possible way to decide what a firm should have known is to 
ask whether the relevant risk was forseeable , or "reasonably " 
forseeable , bu t this method founders on a well-known description 
problem : whether a risk is forseeable depends on how it is described , 
and the choice among possible descriptions is arbitrary . For example , 
the asbestos manufac turers in the 1 93 0 's knew that asbestos caused 
harm . If the asbestos risk is described as "the risk that asbestos is 
harmful to persons , " it was forseeable ; indeed , it was forseen. On 
th e other hand, the manufac turers se emingly did not know that very 
grave harms could oc cur from rela tively low levels of exposur e . If 
th e asbestos risk is described as "the risk that asbestos causes the 
harms that now are seen to result from low exposur e levels, " the risk 
was difficul t to forsee , and perhaps not forse e n .  N o  principled way 
to choose be tween these two descripti ons or others exists . 
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A second way to decide what a firm should have known is not to 
ask whether a risk actually was appreciated but whether it was 
"discoverable " given the present level of sci entific knowledge . 8 This
me thod also is arbitrary , because its use must necessarily pr esuppose 
a se t of cond i tions under which research is conducted ; there are many 
possible se ts of co ndi tions and no principled way to choose among 
them . Was an unanticipated risk "discoverable " given then current 
scientific knowledge if it would have been revealed only by a crash 
Government program--an asbest os Manhat tan Proj e c t ?  Was a risk 
discoverable if a combined industry effor t would have revealed i t ?  If 
a single firm would have had it  devo ted twenty percent of income to a 
research effor t ?  Thirty percent ? No principled way to choose among 
these possible se ts of research conditions exists . 
The seemingly inev itable arbitrariness involved in 
distinguish ing between risks of which firms should and shoul d not have 
been aware has led commenta tors to argue for the rule that imposes 
risks on firms regardl ess of what they knew at production time , and 
some courts have been pursuaded . 9 Other cour ts have al lowed j ur ies to
impose risks on firms when the evidence suggests at most that firms 
knew a risk existed , rather than that they knew its real extent . 10
Yet the notion that firms are j ustifiably ignorant of some risks often 
seems intui tively plausi ble . No one would expect an aspirin 
manufacturer to take precautions against the possibility that aspirin 
will cause toes to fall off . Indeed , a rule that exculpates firms for 
risks of th is type is implied by widely shared notions of fairness : 
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the aspirin manufacturers meant no harm and were not negligent ; hence, 
they had no real chance to protect themselves against a large 
liabilty . If they are required to bear it , this mus t  be because thei r 
fai rne ss claim should be sacrificed to instrumental goals the state 
ough t to pur sue , or because it is subordinate to the moral claims of 
the vict ims . Is it possible , then , to make plaus ible a distinction 
between risks that should and should not have been anticipated in 
cases closer than that of the aspirin manufac tur ers ? I f  so , should 
the manufac turers ' fai rne s s  claim prevail in these closer cases?  Part 
I considers the first of these que stions . 
Consider this defini tion : A firm should be considered 
justi fiably ignor ant of a risk if the product turns out to be more 
dangerous than a cost-effective research program would have predicted . 
The risk of such an outcome is defined as "remote " .  This paper ' s 
precise claim , then , is that cour ts should adopt a modi fied version of 
the second products liability rule : a firm should be held liable 
unles s  it  warned on the basis of what it knew or should have known at 
production time ; and it should have known the revelations of an 
optimal research program . 
Making applica tion of the legal rule turn on the concept of a 
remote risk has two virtues . First , this version of the rule 
elimina tes the arbitrarine s s  otherwise involved in di stinguishing 
be tween risks of' which firms should and should not have been aware .  
Legal out comes would be a funct ion of measur able entiti es--the costs 
of a research program , the nature of the injuries known or likely to 
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occur from a product , and so for th . To be sure , these enti ties 
sometimes may be mor e  measurable in theory than in fact ; the point 
rather is that when the distinction be twe en type s of risk turns on 
them, it becomes a distinction that is at least dr awable in principle . 
Perhaps a be tter way to say this is to refer to the Learned Hand test 
in tort law which , put very simply , provide s that a firm should be 
liable if the expected costs of an accident exceeded the expected 
costs of avoi ding i t . The only novelty of the approach sugge sted here 
will lie in giving content to this test in the research and 
development co ntext : a risk is r emote , put very simply , if the 
expec ted costs of a research project that migh t have di s closed how 
dangerous the product actually is exceeded the expected gain from 
knowing this . Second , the modified rule captures the fairness claim 
just described. The addressees of the sanc t ions that products 
liabil ity law creates are firms ; these firms are known to--indeed are 
supposed to--maximize profits . Hence , they will only know what cost 
justified inquiries could r eveal . To hold th em liable for not knowing 
mor e  is to deprive them of a "fai r chance " to protect themselves . 
�. ! Model of Risk Discovery11 
Products that create toxic risks seldom can be made 
differently . A firm can marke t a toxic subs tance with a warning 
adequa te to its dangerousne ss or not make the substance at all . 
Often , though , the firm does not know how dangerous the substance is .  
This uncer tainty creates difficulties of two sorts . First , suppo se 
the firm bel ieves that , on average, the substance will cause only 
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$1,000 i n  accident related harms . Then, it could sel l  the substance 
with no warni ng or an innocuous warning-- "This product may cause 
harm . " Such a strategy is risky because the product could in fact be 
dangerous ; in this event, the firm would bear the ful l cost because, 
under current law, an inadequa te warning is treated as no warning a t  
all . 1 2 Second, let the firm bel ieve that, on average, th e substance
will cause $s.ooo,ooo in harms . Warnings are cheap to draft and 
distribute in contrast to this exposur e, so the firm could then sel l  
the substance with a strong warning : "This product is highly 
dangerous . "  Such a strategy is risky in a di fferent way. for the 
substance may turn out to be safe . In this event, the strong warning 
would l ose the firm sales, with no corresponding gain . The firm, 
though, has a third choice : rather than warn too softly or strongly 
on inadequa te evidence, it could do research into the substance ' s  
actual dangerousness . If th e firm obtained be tter information about 
how harmful its produ ct was, it could then choose a warni ng level that 
would be mor e  likely to minimize the losses to it from ei ther over or 
underwarni ng. Hence, the gai n  to a firm from research is the expected 
addi tional profit it would earn from ac ting on more rather than less 
information about product safety . 
If we suppose firms to be l iable whenever th ey warn 
inadequately--if firms bear remo te risks--would firms always research 
until th ey discovered all signi ficant dangers? The answer is no . 
Rather, the extent to which a firm would r esearch a product ' s  
dangerousness is a particular function of th e expected benefits from a 
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research proj ect, th e apparent certainty wi th which th ese benefits 
would be obtained, and the costs of the research program . Under the 
legal rule now assumed to obtain, a firm is l iable for al l harm if it 
underwarns--if the product turns out to be more dangerous than the 
warning indica ted . On the other hand, th e firm would lose sal es if it 
overwarned because some potential buyers would be frightened away . 
Thus, the firm faces a distr ibution of possible profits from the 
product ' s  sal e ; it could earn much or l i t tle, depending on how 
sui tabl e to the actual danger i ts warning is . Distributions commonly 
are charac terized by two values, their mean, the average of al l 
out comes, and thei r standard deviation . Let m be the mean of the 
possible profit distribution from sale of a product whose harm causing 
properties are not ful ly known . The size of m is a function of how 
dangerous the firm perceives the product to be. To see why, suppose 
the firm bel ieves the product is very dangerous and so gives a strong 
warning : " This one wil l just about kil l you for sur e . "  Then the firm 
wil l incur almost no l iabil i ty bu t make almost no sal es ; its profits 
will be low . Let the firm instead omit a warning . Then sales will be 
up bu t the firm risks incurring large l iabilities ; inde ed, the 
l iabil i ti es could be so high in relation to sales revenues that the 
expec ted profit from production is nega tive . Hence, whether the firm 
warns or not, the more dangerous it thinks the product is, th e lower 
wil l m be, for m is the mean of the firm ' s  bel iefs respecting 
profitabil ity . And conversely, m wil l sh ift up as th e firm thinks i ts 
product is safe, for then it can give a softer warni ng, thereby 
incr easing sales, or can give no warning wi thout risking as much in 
l iabil i ty . 
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The standard deviation measur es a distribution ' s  spr ead; two­
thirds of the outcomes in a normal distribution--the bel l-shaped 
curve�fal l within one standard dev iation from the mean . 13 Thus, the
larger is a distribution ' s  standard deviati on.  the wider is i ts width . 
Here let a be the standard deviation of the possible profit 
distribution j ust described . Then a is a measur e of the uncertainty 
under which the firm operates . To say that a profit distribution has 
a large a is to say that the firm is not at al l sure j ust how 
dangerous i ts product is ; profits from production could range from 
negative to lovely . 
A research proj ect to de termine the product ' s  actual 
dangerousness thus has two related functions : it is l ikely to shrink 
a. for the spr ead of the profit distri bution ordinarily wil l  contract
as the firm learns more about the product . and r ese arch also may sh ift 
m. for the mean of possible profits will change i f  the new information
suggests that product is mor e  or less dangerous than orginal ly 
thought . Research into products such as toxic substances commonly 
proceeds in stages . At the first stage, the firm can perform a 
relatively inexpensive but low powered test, such as the Ames test for 
mutage neci ty; at the second stage, it can begin animal test ing; at the 
th ird it can commit to a maj or animal study, and so for th . The firm 
then has f ive options: ( a )  Not rese arch at al l, and not sel l  the 
product; ( b )  Not research a t  al l, sel l the product and warn on the 
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basis of its ini tial bel iefs ; ( c )  R esearch until comple tion, defined 
here as finding out precisely how dangerous the substance is ; at 
completion al l uncertainty respe cting h arm is removed ; ( d )  S top the 
research project before comple tion and not make the product ; ( e )  S top 
the research proj ect before completion, make the product and warn on 
the basis of what i t  then knows . 
The firm ' s  initial decision probl em is whether to begin the 
rese arch project at al l ;  if it begins . the probl em becomes whe ther to 
proceed to the next stage or termina te . This is an "optimal stopping 
problem", and to resol ve it the firm needs an "optimal stopping rule " . 
Such a rule maximiz es expected benefits minus costs at each stage 
based on information available a t  that stage, and given that an 
optimal stopping rule will be used at al l future stages . If C is the
expected cost to comple tion of the proj ect from any particular stage, 
and if the distribution of benefits from research is distribu t ed 
normal ly, one optimal stopping rule migh t be : Proceed to the next 
stage i f  and only if C i E[Z j Z 1 O] - m .  Here, Z is a random variable
that repr esents the profits the firm wil l earn i f  it comple tes 
research and sel ls with perfect knowledge, and m, as said above, is 
the profit the firm expects to earn if it does no fur ther research . 
Hence, the inequality simply tel ls that the firm should conti nue to 
research if research costs are less than the di fference be tween the 
val ue to the firm of perfect knowledge--ElZ l z 1 O]--and the value to
the firm of operating on the basis of what it then knows--m . 
In our circumstances, the requisite opt imal stopping rule must 
actual ly be mor e  complex than this because the firm has a variety of 
choices . For example , early research results may disclose 
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sufficiently bright prospe cts about the product so that , when fur ther 
research costs are considered , the optimal strategy is to discontinue 
r esearch and sell it . On the other hand , those results could be so 
discouraging as to just i fy nei ther fur ther research nor sale. Each 
research stage wil l disclose a parti cular benefit mean . Then ,  we can 
consider two possible cut-off values for this mean . First , there must 
A 
be an me such that if the mean that research discloses, m , is less 
A 
than or equal to �· the proj ect should be terminated and the product
no t made . A r esearch result of this sor t might indi cate that the 
produ ct is so highly carcinogenic that the chance of fur ther rese arch 
revealing safety is too smal l to be wor th pursui ng . Second , there 
must be an me such that when m 2 me , the research proj ect should be
termina ted and the product made . A research result of this sor t would 
indi cate such a high degree of safety that the chance of fur ther 
research altering this belief again is not wor th pursuing . Then, only 
A 
when m > me and m < me • should the firm continue to research. A t  each
A -
stage -- i . g . ,  for each value of e -- an me and an me exist, so an 
optimal stopping func tion also exists .  Given it, the firm can 
calculate the expected ne t value of a research pr oject at any stage . 
As the initial statement of an optimal stopping rule told, the value 
of a research proj ect is a function of m and e. Thus we can write a 
valua tion function for a proj ect, V(me,e>. that gives the pro j ect ' s
value when an optimal stopping rule is fol lowed . 
The operation of the optimal stopping rule and the val uation 
func tion can be clarified with a picture . 
Figure 1 
OpciIDal � 
Stopping 
Lines 
.c 
m 
- 0 
The verti cal axis plots the se t of possible benefit means that 
research discloses . The horizontal axis plots the successive stages 
of research . These stages are measured from left to right , so 
increased expenditures on research move the firm toward the vertical 
axis . Points A, B, e and D each repr esent estimates of expected 
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profitability that various levels of research expendi ture generate . A 
point on th e verti cal axis (e = 0 )  represents perfect knowledge of 
dangerousness and thus of profits from sal es . The two rays, me and 
A 
me, are "opt imal stopping l ines "; each of them plots the se t of cut-
off poi nts that tel l the firm when fur ther research is no t wor thwhil e .  
The picture shows that it pays to stop researching when the 
expected profit from sale be comes high or low rel ative to the amount 
of additional research available to the firm . For example, le t a 
firm ' s  initial estimate of profitabi l i ty be at point A . There 
A. 
me < m < me so the firm wil l  begin a rese arch pro j ec t . If early
resul ts reveal a profit mean such as B, the firm wil l conti nue to 
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research.. But if fur ther resul ts reveal that the firm is at points C 
or D, the firm would t erminate the research proj ec t . At C, wh ich is 
above the po si tive optimal stopping l ine, the l ikel ihood that fur ther 
research would reveal serious danger J,. . � . ,  unprofitab.ility -- is so 
low th at the firm ' s  be st strategy is to marke t the product, warning on 
the basis of what it then knows . A t  D,  the product is so likely to be 
highly dangerous that the firm ' s  be st strategy is not to make i t  at 
al l .  
The pic ture also shows that firms will almost never have 
perfect knowledge about safety ; research resul t s  wil l cause a firm to 
hit one or th e other optimal s t opping l ine befor e th e verti cal axis is 
reached . This resul t is consi s t ent with experience . Perfect 
knowledge about the harm causing propensi ties of complex product s ,  
such as toxic substances, simply does not exist . For exampl e, 
scientists now ide nti fy actual carcinogens by observ ing how substances 
affect animal s and persons, not from theor ies that predict 
dangerousne ss from th e substances ' chemical structur e .  The former 
method canno t yield certain answers when applied to new produc t s . 
The two optimal stopping l ines in Figure 1 are represented as 
rays out of the origin . To see why th is is so, recal l that we wrote a 
valua tion function for a research proj ect, V(mc,C), that gives its
value when an opt imal stopping rule is fol lowed . Thi s  valuation 
function i s  an expected mone tary value that is measur ed in the same 
uni ts as m, C and v . 14 Research and development models commonly 
1 8 
assume constant marginal rates of subs t i tution be tween research inputs 
and output s ; 1 5  for example, if input s  into research are doubl ed, 
research output doubl e s  also . This means here that a shrinks in 
direct propor tion to the costs incurr ed in research . Now th e 
valua tion function for a project with constant returns is l inearly 
homogeneous--a straigh t l ine . Then for a fixed a we can write V in
the func tional form : V ( m , C )  = mg ( m/C ) ,  which is l inear . 16 We can l e t  
A. 
m m 
C
C 
= R and C
C = S and solve for th e optimal stopping function : this 
function actually wil l  consist of two rays out of the origin--the 
,. 
"optimal stopping l ines "--which are me = RC for al l R and me = SC for
al l s. These l ines have slopes of R and S respectively . 
Figure 1 shows that the slopes of the opt imal stopping l ines 
are impor tant de terminants of how much research is done . For example, 
the smal ler is S in Figure 1, the flatter is the posi tive optimal 
stopping l ine, and the mor e l ikely is th e firm to sell without doing 
very much research . As another il lustration, observe Figure 2 ,  in 
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which only posi tive values of m are considered . 
Figure 2 
m 
·B • c 
c 
Because S is so smal l, points A ,  B and C from Figur e 1 lie above the 
opt imal stopping l ine ; if the firm is at any such point, it will sel l 
without doing fur ther research . Research would be done were the firm 
at Point D ,  but then the be nefit mean must be low--i . �  • •  early 
research resul ts would indicate a rela tively high l ikel ihood of 
danger . 
The slope S tur ns out to vary directly with the standard 
dev iation of possibl e be nefits, a, and to vary inversel y  with rese arch 
costs, c . 1 7  This result is intui tively plausible . When a is h igh, 
conside rabl e uncertainty about a product exists, so the firm has an 
ince ntive to research, and when C is low, research is inexpensive, so 
again the firm is l ikel y  to do i t . But if th e firm perceives a to be 
smal l or C to be high, and the product has a good chance of being 
profitable, the firm ' s  best strategy is to sel l  it wi thout ful l 
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research ; in this ci rcumstance, S is then small so the world l ooks to 
the firm l ike Figure 2 .  
To summariz e , the model shows that the amount of research a 
profit maximiz ing firm wil l do r egarding how dangerous a product is 
depends on three variables : the mean of the profit distribution if 
the firm wer e  to sel l  without doing further research ; the variance of 
this distribution--the amount of uncer tainty about dangerousness ; and 
r esearch costs . For example , when a particular product is thought not 
to pose a great danger ( th e  ini tial m is r el atively high ) ,  this view 
is plausi bly held ( th e  initial a is low )  and a r ese arch proj ect is 
expensive (C is high ) ,  a profit maximizing firm is l ikel y  to sel l 
without strong warnings and wi thout doing much research . If the 
produc t  is in fact dangerous , the firm would not know i t ; in the 
language used here, the risk of such great danger is remote . 
These criteria may il luminate the asbestos cases . The 
asbestos companies issued mild warnings to thei r own workers but 
warned no one else, nor did they perform tests to determine the actual 
harm th at asbestos could cause . 1 8 In th e 1920 ' s  and 193 0 ' s, asbestos
was though t to cause asbestosis, a serious but not invariably fatal 
disease . Perso ns thought to be at risk worked in asbestos "texti l e "  
fac t ori es--firms t h a t  manufac tur ed asbestos . These workers were 
covered under Worker ' s  Compensa tion Laws . Because asbest osis was 
though t to be caused only at high exposur e  leve ls, workers in other 
industries, such as those who instal led asbestos in sh ips or 
buildings, were assumed not to be at risk.19 Hence, a firm tha t 
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fail ed to warn strongly could bel i eve i t s  expected tor t l iabil ity from 
asbe stos sales to be manageable . Not many workers were exposed : not 
al l of them would become i l l : not al l who become ill would suffer
horribly and die ; and the victims were at least partial ly insur ed . 
Consequentl y ,  the mean of the possible profit distribution from 
sel ling asbestos wi thout perfect knowledge of its dangerousne s s  was 
rel a tively high . Further , there was l i t tle indi cation in the American
medical literature that asbe stos could cause widely spread harms , 
including cancer , at low exposur e level s .  Also , government 
regulations concerning permissible amount s  of asbestos in work 
environments were unchanged be tween the late 1 93 0s and the late 1 96 0s .
Thus, firms may have held their view of the profit mean with relative
certainty , which is to say that the spread of possible profits from 
the sale of asbestos , a, probably was perce ived as smal l .
2 0 Finally , 
labor atory testing of carcinogenic substances nei ther was then nor is
now wel l  developed , nor are result s  o n  animal s easily extrapolated to
humans . Unsurprisingly ,  the true extent of the asbe stos disaster was 
revealed o nly by a retrospec tive study of workers who had been heav ily 
exposed in simil ar circumstances . 2 1  An asbe stos manufacturer would
have had great di fficulty co nducting a retrospective study of workers
whom it did not employ and whose expo sur e experiences differed widely 
among industr ies; and prospe ctive test s for po tential ly carci noge ni c 
substance s are notoriously hard to do . 22 Thus , for a given firm the 
co sts of a project researching the dangerousnes s  of asbestos , C ,  were
l ikely high . The model just set for th shows that when a is smal l and 
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m and C are high , firms are l ikely to warn weakly and do l i t tle 
research , even when they are requi red to bear al l risks . Par t IC next 
shows that the model al so appl ies when firms operate under a rule that 
requires them to warn only of risks of which they should h ave been 
aware . The asbestos manufacturers operated under a rule much l ike 
th is in the 1 93 0s and 1 940s . Ther efor e ,  that they ac t ed in the way 
the model predict s--issuing weak warnings and not conducting t est s--is 
unsurprising . The asbe stos risk may have been remo te . 
The model used here suppo sed a particular kind of research 
proj ect , that was co nduc t ed in stages and whose outcomes were normal ly 
distributed . O ther kinds of proj ects are plainly possible . For 
example , research results some times are discontinuous : sudden 
breakthroughs occur . I have said nothing formal about research 
proj ects of th is sor t .  Hence , the exercise here should be regarded 
nor e as an inv itation to construct a family of models relevant to the 
&oxic risk probl em than as a complete de scription of the toxic risk 
research process . Neverthele s s , many real research proj ects 
approximate the co ndi tions of the model , and the conduct of most 
�roj e c t s  is l ikely to be a function of the mean of expected benefit s ,  
&he distribution o f  that mean and the costs o f  rese arch , interacting 
nuch as the model de scribe s .  Therefore ,  decisionmakers using these 
3ri teria could distinguish be tween remo te and knowable risks with at 
Least as much plausi bil ity--1 . �  • •  in at least as principl ed a 
�ashion--as obtains in the usual products l iabil ity design defect 
Jase . 
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Q. Lessons
In the model, firms bore remote risks ; a firm knew it would be 
l iable whenever i ts warning was inadequate to a product ' s  actual 
dangerousness . The analysis implied that a substantial se t of risks 
would remain incorrec tly estimated under this assumption . A safe ty­
based j ustification for imposing r emote risks on firms must then be 
th at the se t of underestimated r isks would grow were firms r equi red 
only to warn of what they ac tually knew or of what opt imal inquiries 
would disclose . This justification is false . Let a firm bel ieve that 
( i ) It wil l be held l iable only for risks whose value i t  knows or can 
optimal ly discover ; ( ii )  A cour t or jury wil l later independently 
decide what the scope of an optimal inquiry was ; ( ii i )  The cour t or 
jury can de termine the precise values of m,  a and C as the firm did or
should have viewed them � ante . In th ese circumstances, the firm 
will research only when and for as long as the three decision 
variables m, a and C direct i t  to ; were the firm to do less, the cour t 
or jury would hold it l iable, and the firm could not do more . The 
oversigh t function of the cour t and jury, th at is, functions to induce 
the firm to behave optimal ly on the basis of what it knows, which is 
just the behav ior the model describes. Therefore, imposi ng only 
remo te risks on firms ca nno t reduce the se t of risks that firms will 
discover ; the modi fied second l iabil ity rul e described in Part IA 
should govern. 
This conclusion does not turn on the assumption that cour ts 
and j ur ies can precisely de termine m, a and C as the firm saw or ough t 
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to have seen them . If the mor e realistic assumption is made that a 
decisionmaker can measur e these variables only roughly , firms wil l be 
induced to pursue exc essive rather than inadequa te research programs . 
To see why , one should r eal ize that when these variables cannot be 
measur ed precisely ,  the decisionmake r may err . Thus , if courts seek 
to impose only knowable risks o n  firms, a firm nevertheless faces a 
posi tive probabil i ty of bearing a remo te risk ; it may be found l iabl e  
for a n  inadequate warning though i t  acted optimal ly i n  not discovering 
the product ' s  actual dangerousness . For toxic substances, this 
l iabil ity may be large . Also , the probabil i ty that the firm wil l 
incur l iabil i ty is partly a function of the amount of rese arch that it  
does ; for if the decision variables canno t be measur ed precisely, th e 
firm ' s  ex post claim to have behaved optimal ly is the mor e  persuasive 
the mor e  research it actual ly did . When a firm faces a posi tive 
probabil ity of being found l iable though it behaved o ptimal ly ,  this 
l iabil i ty is large, and its l ikel i hood is partly a function of the 
firm ' s  own behav ior, the firm has an incentive to be mor e  careful than 
a cost-benefit cal culation alone would dictate . 2 3  In our terms, a 
firm wil l do mor e  research than would be opt imal if courts and j uries 
could measur e m, a and C exactly . 
It may be though t ,  then, th at an effici ency justi fication for 
imposi ng r emo te risks on firms is not that this would prevent 
insufficient r esearch into toxic r isks bu t that it would prevent too 
much . Were all risks imposed on firms , a par ticular firm ' s  l iabil ity 
would no longer be a function of how much research it actual ly did ; 
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hence, i t  would do only the optimal amount . On the other hand, 
imposing r emote risks incr eases the uncertainty under which firms must 
function, and may unduly restrict the number of firms . Also, as we 
wil l next see, the publ ic goods aspec t  of research causes f irms to do 
too little of it ; co nsequently, whatever excess research is induced by 
the rule argued for is a useful counterweigh t . Therefore, efficiency 
concerns do not imply holding firms l iable for remote risks . 
To perceive th e publ ic goods problem that affects research, 
suppose : ( i ) There are N = 1 0 0  firms in an industry, each of them 
having an equal marke t share ; ( ii )  A l l  produce a homoge neous product­
-asbestos--that they bel ieve may cause harm but they do not know how 
much ; ( ii i )  The mean of the distribution of benefits from perfect 
knowledge of danger is $10, 000, 000 for the industry as a whole, which 
al l firms know ; th is mean is cal led H; ( iv )  The cost of a research 
proj ect to discover the harm . c. would be $1, 5 00, 000 ; ( v) I f  a firm 
discovered the ful l extent of the harm, it would gain only the be nefit 
to i t  of warning optimal ly ;  the discoverer could not tax other firms 
to recover a por tion of the gai ns i ts research conferred on them . 
These other firms would have gains because the discoverer ' s  warni ng 
would tel l th em as wel l as co nsumers j ust how dangerous the product 
was, and so th ey too could warn optimal ly . 
In these circumstances, the research proj ect should be done 
but no firm would do i t .  The expected social gain from research is 
$10,000, 000 while the social cost is only $1, 500, 000 ; H > c. However,
assumption ( v) impl ies that a private firm would only do research if 
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H/N > C ;  each such firm would gain only the frac tion H/N of the
benefits research yields . Here any discoverer would gai n  only 
$100, 000, so H/N < C; no firm would do the research proj ect, because
its cost would exce ed the firm ' s  gai n .  Assumption ( v) happens to be 
true . Also, toxic substance marke ts sometimes seem l ikely to resemble 
the wor ld of assumptions ( i ) -( iv ) . Hence, whatever exc essive research 
is induced by a rule imposing o nly remote risks on firms is desirable, 
given the tende ncy of firms to do too little research into toxic risks 
general ly . 2 4 
II . Corporate Struc ture and Bankruptcy 
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Analyses of the relationship be twe en tort, corporate and 
bankruptcy law do not distinguish be twe en r emote and knowable risks . 
This failure underlies much of the difficul ty that the latter two 
bodies of law have had in de aling with situa tions such as the asbe stos 
cases . Part IIA thus puts remote risks aside, to co nsider the 
corporate and bankruptcy aspe c t s  of knowabl e risk impositions . It 
shows that when risks are knowable, in the se nse Part I developed, the 
law now makes it difficul t for firms to shift risks they can more 
cheaply bear or to avoid paying valid claims . Also, legal reforms 
that would al toge ther preclude these forms of misbehavior are 
rel a tively convenient to ado pt . Such reforms include reducing the 
protection that limited liabil ity confers on firm owners; incr easing 
the reach of the successor liability doctrine ; and preventing firms 
from discharging in bankruptcy claims based on inj uries that have yet 
to arise . Part I I . B then returns to the remote risk concern to show 
that impo sing remote risks on firms creates two r el ated difficul ties : 
Fi rst, victims often wil l be undercompe nsated . Second, firms will 
attempt to avoid liability, and their efforts wil l cause substantial 
wel fare losses . Current corporate and bankruptcy laws deal badly with 
these difficul ties but neither the reforms j ust discussed nor others 
would hel p .  The most impor tant fac tor that dr ives the anal ysis Par t 
II make s is that firms generally wil l or can be induced to insur e 
against knowabl e risks, or not operate, while firms will no t insur e 
remote risks to th eir ful l extent . To summarize, Part II argues that, 
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when corporate and bankruptcy law aspe c t s  are co nside red, remo te risk 
impo si tions not only may be unfair, as Part IA sugge sted, but also 
cannot serve the law ' s  compensa tion and efficiency goal s in the way 
that knowable risk impositions can . 
A· Knowab le Risks � the Externalization Problem 
l· The De layed Risk Concern 
Persons and firms who insure ful ly against the ac cide nts they 
may cause obv iously can compensate victims . Also, al though a person 
or firm who insures fully does not nece ssarily face the correct 
ince ntives to take care, 2 4a from the viewpoint of reducing ac cide nt
costs no good reasons exis t  to create legal incentives to purchase 
less than ful l  insurance ; such incentives could never increase but are 
like l y  to reduce the level of care that would o therwise be taken .  The 
law, however, creates incentives not to insur e ful ly . Accide nt 
victims can draw primarily on an individual tor tfeasor ' s  tangibl e  
weal th to satisfy tort j udgments entered against him, n o  matter how 
much greater th an his tangible weal th those j udgments may be . Victims 
cannot also draw on the human capital aspe ct of a tor tfeasor ' s  weal th, 
by forcing him to devo te a fraction of his futur e earning capacity to 
paying compensation, because a bankruptcy option exis t s : when 
liability judgments exceed tangibl e weal th, th e defendant can offer up 
only that weal th, and then have tor t j udgments dis charged in 
bankrupt cy. Hence, individuals have a form of limited liability , 
which dilutes their incentive to insure ful ly when the largest 
expec ted liability they face exceeds their tangible wealth . To see 
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how th is dilut ion func tions, suppose that Jones has $10, 000 i n  weal th 
and faces a linear insur ance premium schedule, where $ . o s  buys $1 . 00 
of coverage no matter how much coverage is take n .  Then consider this 
tabl e : 
( 1 ) ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  ( S )  ( 6 )  
Effective 
Tangible Price Per 
Weal th that Largest Premium Total Dollar of 
I nsur ance Expected Coverage Per Dol lar Premium Protection 
Protects L iabil ity Purch ased of Coverage ( 3 ) x ( 4) ( S) -t- ( 1 )  
$10, 000 $s,ooo $s,ooo $.os $2SO $ . OS 
$10, 000 $10,000 $10, 000 $ . OS $soo $ . OS 
$10, 000 $20, 000 $20, 000 .t . o s  $1000 .t . 1 0  
$10,000 $40, 000 $40 , 000 $ . OS $2000 $ . 2 0  
$10, 000 $80 , 000 $80 , 000 $.OS $4000 $ . 40 
Because the tangi ble weal th that insur ance protects remains constant 
while the premium necessary to protect this weal th rises with coverage 
purchased, the price per dol lar of actual protection also must rise : 
in the il lustration, when the l argest expected liability is fifty 
percent of tangible weal th, the price of protec t i ng a dol lar of this 
weal th is $ . OS; when the largest expec ted l iabil ity is four times 
tangible weal th, the price rises to $ . 2 0 . Given l imited l i abil ity, 
the incentive to insur e thus varies inversely with: (a) the
di ffer ence be tween th e largest expected l iability and tangibl e 
personal wealth, and ( b )  the pr obabil ity that l iabil ities 
significantly exce eding tangible weal th will be incur red . Respecting 
this second factor, when the probabil ity of such large l iabil ities is 
high, a person will bel ieve hersel f likely to be in the sta te where 
insurance is relatively expensive per dol lar of protection, and so has 
a lessened incentive to insur e . On the other hand, if Jones does not 
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insure, she may ac tual ly become bankrupt . Persons disl ike bankruptcy 
and strive to avoid i t . Consequently, Jones faces conflicting 
incentives when the largest l iabil ity she may cause exce eds her 
tangible weal th, not to i nsur e ful ly and to insur e ful ly . 
A recent paper, whose subj ect was the decision to purchase 
automobil e liability insurance, showed that a person wil l  insur e if 
the premium he would pay to equalize his i ncome in all possi ble futur e 
sta tes of the world exceeds the expected value of the uncol lectible 
claims against him if he purchases no insur ance . 2 S  Thus, if the
largest expected l iabi l i ty in the il lustration above were $20, 000 and 
would be incurred with a probabil ity of . 01 ,  Jones would insure if she 
valued never being bankrupt at more than $100: . 0 1  ( $20 , 000 - $10, 000 ) .
In formal terms, let L equal th e l argest liability against Jones if 
she negl igently injur es another and l e t  W be Jone ' s  weal th . Then l e t  
P b e  the pr emium she would b e  wil ling t o  pay to avoid bankruptcy and p 
be the probabil ity that L is incurred . The expected value, e, of 
uncol lectible claims above Jone ' s  weal th is then p ( L  - 'W) = e, and 
Jones wil l insure against L if P > e .  This model shows that the
l ikel ihood of purchasing insur ance for an individual varies direc tly 
with th e amount of weal th a person has ( W) and his desi re to keep it 
( P ) ,  and varies inversel y  with the probabil ity of a crushing ac cident 
( p )  and its siz e ( L) in relation to one ' s  weal th . To r e turn to the 
illustration, when p is high and L - W is large, e also will be l arge . 
The larger is e the less l ikely is i t  that P > e, and so the less
l ike l y  is it that Jones would purch ase ful l insur ance . The da ta show 
th at approximately twenty percent of persons fail to insur e or 
underinsure for automobile accide nts .26
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A di fficul ty with this model is that the risk premium, P ,  is 
unspecified ; it is just a function of risk aversion .  But P can be 
given more content if we consider an entreprene ur de ciding whether to 
begin a corporation that has l imited l iabil i ty . This is because for a 
firm, unl ike a private person, futur e existence (and, hence, al l 
futur e earnings ) depend upon avoiding bankruptcy . Much of the weal th 
of individuals is their human capi tal, their abi l i ty to work 
productively . As we have seen, the bankruptcy option permits persons 
to ge t a fresh star t ; hence, an indiv idual whom l iabil ity judgments 
bankrupt may continue to draw on the human capi tal por tion of her 
weal th as if those judgments h ad never been rendered . In co ntr ast, a 
bankrupt f irm must cease operations, for i ts weal th is largely its 
physical capi tal, which credi tors can take . Firms are valued as 
perpe tui ties : if I equals ne t expect ed earnings per year and r is the 
firm ' s  cost of capi tal, 27 the value of a firm ' s  earnings in
perpe tui ty, V, is equal to I/r .  An entrepreneur who insur es her firm 
agai nst l iabi lties, even when those l i abil ities coul d exceed the 
firm ' s  asse ts, thus secures I/r always . And so, the risk pr emium for 
an entr epreneur depends impor tantly on her firm ' s  expec ted future 
earni ngs ; the higher they are in relation to the weal th that must be 
contri buted to begin the firm, the more l ikely is the firm to be ful ly 
insur ed, even against l iabil ities that wil l exc e ed this weal th .  
This analysis has two useful implications . First, when a risk 
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is knowabl e, an entrepr eneur who se ts up a manufacturing firm is 
likel y  to have it insur e ful ly, despite the existence of l imited 
l iabil ity . This fol lows first because such firms commonly possess 
substantial weal th in the form of physi cal capi tal, and seco nd because 
entr epr eneurs will expect to earn a signi ficantly higher return on 
this weal th than the risk-free return--the rate on Treasury bil ls . 
Oth erwise, it is pointl ess to start the firm . When weal th is h igh, 
expec ted income thus is h igh in absolute terms . And when a firm has 
substantial weal th that is at risk to victims and earns a high income, 
it is l ikel y  to insur e ful ly, unless its liabil ity exposur e greatly 
exceeds i ts weal th . 
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This analysis also suggests that when i t  pays not t o  insure 
ful ly, it often wil l pay not to operate the firm at al l .  A f irm is 
less likely to insur e when the probability of an accide nt ( p )  is h igh, 
it does not earn a large income and i ts liabi l i ty exposur e is very 
high in r el ation to i ts weal th . But when p is high, a substantial 
chance exists that crushing ac cide nt costs wil l material ize early, 
th ereby providing the firm with only a brief period in which to 
recover star tup costs and earn a prof i t . If its income is not large, 
th is period wil l be too brief . For example, suppose th at a firm 
requires $100, 000 of weal th to begin ; it will earn a relatively high 
ne t income on investment of $1 5, 000 a year ; its discount rate is . 1 0 ;  
i ts asse ts depreciate a t  a real rate o f  lO'li a year ; accident costs
that greatly exceed th e firm ' s  weal th will materialize in the very 
beginning of th e thi rd year, and it does not pay the firm to insure. 
Then, the expected value to an entrepr eneur of operati ng the firm 
without insurance is negative by in excess of $3 0, 00o . 2 8  The
entrepreneur wil l not insure her firm against al l ac cident costs, but 
will not begin it e i ther . Therefor e, when risks are knowable, 
manufac turing firms wil l generally insur e fully or not operate . 2 9
A n  exception t o  this conclusion may exist i f  accident costs 
are l ikely no t to material ize for sev eral years after star tup . Le t an 
entr epr eneur expect her firm to incur no accident costs for five 
years ; in years six to inf ini ty, accide nts will happen, and in each of 
these years a posi tive probabil ity wil l  exist of incurring a l iability 
that wil l exceed the firm ' s  weal th .  If it do es not pay to insur e, the 
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entr epreneur nevertheless would operate if she could earn enough in 
the accident-free period to recover startup costs and make a profit . 
That th e risk of accidents is del ayed is significant because, other 
things equal, th e longer the accide nt-free period, the more l ikely it 
is that th e strategy of operating wi thout insurance will be 
profitabl e .  
Operation of a firm without i nsurance when i ts po tential 
l iabil i ti es exceed i ts asse ts is plainl y  undesirable because the firm 
externalizes risk to victims . The entr epreneur, when deciding what 
products to make, wil l not compare the accide nt costs of victims to 
her expected gains, but rather wil l compare only the value of the 
firm ' s  weal th to those gains . As this wealth, by defini tion, is l ess 
than the victims ' costs, entrepreneurs may produce too many defective 
products . Also, when entrepr eneurs o perate firms in a delayed r isk 
context and do not insure, those firms often wil l have nega tive value ; 
that is, the firms could not earn enough to justify operation if the 
firms could not ext ernal ize risk but instead had to bear it . 
Operation of nega tiv e value firms is undesirable because these firms 
generate social costs that exceed their social gains . Thus, it is 
impor tant to ask whether corporate and bankruptcy law actually do 
permi t entrepreneurs to external ize risk to victims and to operate 
negative value firms, by establ ishing companies that function without 
insurance and that dissolve when accidents happe n .  
Part II . A2 next models the de cision o f  an entrepreneur 
consideri ng whether to establ ish a firm in a del ayed r isk context, and 
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if so whether to insure against the accide nts the firm may cause . It 
formal ly derives the conclusions th at were j ust se t out intuitively . 
Readers who dislike models may move to subsection ( 3 )  without losing 
the thread . 
i .  A Limited Liability Risk Avoidanc e Model
The model assumes : ( a )  an e ntrepreneur , who may be a firm , 
wants to begin a business that wil l make a product ; ( b )  the product 
causes injuries to users some years after sal e ;  ( c )  the entrepr eneur 
and insurance companies know th is but consumers and workers do not ;  
( d )  the business th at makes the product wil l not warn adequately 
agai nst i ts risk ; ( e )  a probabil i ty exists that the firm wil l incur a 
l iabi l i ty th at exc e eds i ts weal th in any year after the ac cide nt-free 
period ends ; ( f) insurance premiums are actuarily fai r ;  the insurance 
company earns zero profits ; ( g )  limited l iabil ity exists ; ( h ) 
successor l iabil ity does not exist ; a purchaser of the firm ' s  asse ts 
is no t liabl e for i ts torts ; ( i ) continge nt tor t claims are 
nondisch argeable in bankruptcy . The model uses the fol lowing 
notation : I = a firm ' s  expe cted ne t income per year ; V = ne t present
value of the firm ; r = the firm ' s  discount rate ; W = the firm ' s  
weal th ;  t = number of years the firm can operate befor e i t  must begin 
to pay products liability costs ; L = th e largest l iabil ity it faces 
from accide nts ; p = probabil ity that accidents in the amount of L wil l 
be i ncurred . 
In th e accide nt-free period, the firm earns income , valued a t  
t � I / C l + r ) t . After th is period, the firm wil l earn income in each
year with probabil ity ( 1  - p) and earn no income whil e losing all
weal th with probability p ( L is then incurred ) .  I t  can be shown3 0
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that the value to the firm of operating i n  the years when accide nts 
can happe n is I - p ( I  + W) . • Hence , we can write the value of the
C r + p ) ( l + r )  
firm without insurance as : 
VW = t ( l  _I _ I - p ( I  - W) + t ' + r ) t C r  + p ) ( l + r )  ( 1 )  
I f  a firm insures ful ly , its income i s  constant over all futur e states 
of the wor l d . Hence , its value is 
!. 
-VI = r 
.Pb 
r 
( 1  + r ) t+l 
The se cond t erm is th e present discounted value of a stream of 
( 2) 
insurance payments th at must be paid beginni ng in the year t + 1 ;  each
payment equals the risk ( p L )  of incurring liabil ity . 
The firm ' s  strategy turns on a comparison of these values . If 
v1 > Vw and v1 is greater than the value the resources at issue would
have in another use , the firm wil l operate with insur ance ; if v1 < Vw 
and VW is the highest valued use of th e resources , the firm wil l 
operate without insuranc e . Otherwise , the firm wil l not operate . I t  
i s  use ful t o  compare v1 and Vw · 
.Pb 
!. _ -��­
r ( 1  + r ) t+l
Rearrangi ng terms , we ge t 
! f I + I - p ( I  + W) > 'o- c 1 + r ) t C r + p ) ( l + r ) t ( 3 )  
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I [ ( l  + r ) ( l - r ) p  - r { l  + r ) t+l ( r  + p ) ] i> rp[L ( r  + p )  - ( 1  + r ) W] ( 4 )
B y  inspection o f  ( 4) , w e  see that the right hand side , VW ' wil l be
nega tive if L < W, for L is weighted by (r + p ) , which always is less 
than ( 1  + r ) , the weighting factor for W .  This says that if the 
l argest expected liabil ity a firm faces ( L) is l ess than the firm ' s  
weal th ( W) , it wil l never pay the firm to operate without insurance : 
the firm wil l ei ther insur e ful ly or not exist . When L > W ,  the righ t 
hand side is likely to exce ed the left hand side , VI ' if : ( i ) ( L  - W) 
is large ; ( ii) p is high ; ( ii i )  t is long ;  and ( iv )  I is large when t 
is long . The intuition underlying the first two conditions has been 
se t out above . Respecting the third , the longer is the accident free 
period ( t ) , the mor e  likely is the entr epreneur to recover the weal th 
contribu t ed to the firm and earn a profit . Then,  the less l ikely is 
the entr epreneur to have her firm insur e ,  for insurance is bough t to 
protect W so th at income ( I )  is earned . The desire for insur ance is 
weakened £ fortiori if I also is large when t is long ,  which condi tion
( iv )  states . Further , by inspection of ( 3 ) and ( 4 )  we see that VW is 
likely to exceed z ero when W is smal l .  This says that the less weal th 
th e entr epr eneur must put at risk to victims , th e mor e likely is 
operation without insur ance to be its best strategy .
3 0a 
These inequal ities also reveal a striking fact : it can be 
th at VI < O whil e Vw > o .  In this event , the existence of limited
l iability and a del ayed risk permit an entr epr eneur to ope rate a 
nega tive value firm . Such a firm ge nerates social costs that exceed 
its social gains , for VI < 0 only when the present value of the firm ' s
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income str eam is l ess than the present value of the liability risks it 
creates . 
In many cases ,  when VI is l ess than Vw and Vw is posi tive , VI 
wil l be nega tiv e ; it is profit maximizing to operate without insur ance 
because the firm could not survive if it had to take account of al l 
risks that it creates . Consider this il lustration : I = $10 , 000 ; r 
. 1 0 ;  L = $200 , 0 00 ; W = $1 50 , 000 ; p = . 1 0 ; t = 5 .  The n ,  
� 
v = l - t+• = -$1 2 , 9 94 . 3 5 .  I r ( 1 + r )  
t 
vw = � ( 1  I + + r ) t 
I - p ( I  + W) 
= $19 , 1 84 . 67 . 
t 
The expec ted value to an entr epreneur 
(r + p ) ( l + r )  
o f  operating a firm without insurance is positive ( VW > 0) , but the
firm has negative value al l costs considered . This firm should not 
operate , however , for two r easons : it external izes risk to victims 
because its l iabil ity exposur e exceeds its weal th, and it could no t 
pay its way were it made to bear ful l liabil ity costs ( VI 0 ) . 
It is also useful to focus on W ,  the firm ' s  wealth . In many 
cases , including those invol ving toxic products,  no single suit wil l 
be for an amount th at wil l exceed W .  Rather , the firm wil l face a 
substantial se t of suits whose total value wil l exc eed its wealth or 
it wil l face almost no suits at al l .  For exampl e ,  the firm ' s  product 
causes cancer or it does not ; if the former ,  there wil l be many suits ; 
if the latter , none . The first "cancer sui t "  thus informs the firm 
that it is in th at state of th e world wher e its liabil ity exposur e 
exc eeds W .  The firm may the n  sel l  its asse ts , distribute the proceeds 
to its owners and dissolve . If th e entr epreneur knows at the
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begi nni ng that potential victims would hav e  di fficul ty enfor cing 
j udgments agai nst the owners , sh e also knows that she wil l not lose W 
to victims when accidents happe n .  Rather , i f  W i s  star tup costs-­
purchasing mach ines and the like--plus the good will that wil l be lost 
when the firm disappears , and if W '  is  the pr esent discounted value of 
the proceeds the firm wil l receive when it sel ls its asse t s , the firm 
wil l lose W - W ' . This sum is less than W ,  because we impl icitly
assumed above that W = W.  And the less the firm will lose to victims 
when liabil ity is incurred , the more l ikely is the firm to operate 
without ful l insur ance . 
In th e wor ld of th is mode l , entrepr eneurs may operate firms 
th at externalize knowabl e risks to victims and often have nega tive 
value , i f  products liability costs do not material ize until years 
after star tup . Does the law permit this behavior in our world?  
1_. The Possibility of Bad Behavior
( a )  Limited Liabil ity 
That limited liability permit s  entrepr eneurs to externalize 
tor t risks to victims is wel l-know n . 3 1  The literature commonly refers
to such victims as "unrelated " because they are assumed not to deal 
with firms befor e their injuries , and thus canno t compel firms to take 
ri sks into account through th e mechani sms of wage or price bargai ns . 
Potential victims who do bargain with firms , however , al so may be 
unable to compel firms to take risks into account if they are 
uni nformed about accident probabil ities . In bo th 
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case s ,  firms wil l consider risks only if accide nt cos t s  are imposed on 
them through tor t j udgment s . Limited l iabil ity reduces the force of 
th is incentive because it permit s  entrepr eneur s to put less weal th at 
risk to victims than the expected value of the ac cidents the firms may 
cause . It is sh own her e ,  however , that at least as regards 
manufac turing firms l imited l iabil ity is a problem more in theory than 
in l ife . Entr epreneurs h ave strong incentives to insur e such f irms 
ful ly against al l ac cide nt s ,  and ful l insurance al toge ther prevents 
risk external ization . These ince ntives , though , are diluted 
substantially when the harms a t tr i butable to a firm ' s  actions do not 
material ize for several years : in such "delayed risk" context s  
limited l iabil ity ac tual ly can cr eate a pathological incentive for 
entr epreneurs to operate firms wi thout insurance , and thereby 
external ize risk . Toxic subs tances represent the most significant 
case of del ayed harm . Conseque ntly , limi ted l iability seems 
perni cious primarily in toxic substance marke ts . 
( b )  Successor L iabil i ty 
When suc cessor l iability obtains , a buyer of a firm ' s  assets 
is l iabl e for the seller ' s  products l iabil ity co sts . 3 2 The do ctrine 
is useful because tor t victims have di fficul ty suing the owners of 
dissolved corpor ations . Wer e  a sel ler of corpor ate asse ts to remain 
in exi stence after the sale , suit would be easy ; the sel l er would only 
have rearranged its asse t s , from old mach ine s  to cash or what the cash 
bough t ,  and the victims coul d r each either . But if the sel ler 
dissolved , tor t victims would have to locate and sati sfy judgments 
against its former owners .  The longer is the period be tween 
dissolution and the material ization of accidents , the more difficul t 
is th is task . Also , many states severely restr ict or prohibit sui ts 
against former owners on cl aims arising after dissolution. 3 3  The
difficul ties invol ved in suing former owner s  create an incentive for 
th e owners to begin firms that externalize risk . The succe ssor 
l iabil ity doctrine compensa tes for this perverse incentive . 
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To best perceive i t s  function , recal l that entrepr eneurs are 
l ikely to operate without insur ance i f  they can earn e nough in the 
accident free years to recover the weal th they contributed to the firm 
and earn a profit . It is necessary , we sai d , to recover the value of 
the weal th original ly contr ibuted because when accidents occur this 
weal th is lost to victims . The difficul ties involved in suing former 
owner s  fal sify th is statement . An e ntr epreneur who can operate until 
th e first victims appear , sel l her firm ' s  asse ts and vanish with the 
cash doe s  not lose the weal th sh e contributed to the firm plus good 
wil l ;  rather , she loses the d ifference be tween these things and the 
receipts from the asse t sal e . The smal ler is this expected difference 
ex ante , the less weal th the entr epreneur expects to lose to victims . 
And th e less weal th lost , the mor e l ikely wil l  the firm be to operate 
uninsured . 
Successor liabil ity dampens the perverse ince ntive that the 
dissolution option cr eates . It does this by incr easing the weal th 
that an entrepr eneur will lose to victims , for its existence increases 
the difference between initial moni e s  expe nded to start a firm and 
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monies later received on the sal e of asse ts . This difference widens 
because a succe ssor that is l iabl e for its pr edecessors tor ts wil l pay 
less for its predece s sor ' s  asse t s ,  since they now come wi th accrued 
liabil ities . Indeed , were a potential successor to operate the same 
busine s s  as the original company , it would be unl ikely to buy the 
original company ' s  asse ts at al l .  The original company wil l  want to 
sell when accide nt costs begin to accrue . But if the successor is 
responsible for its pr edecessor ' s  tor t s , it wil l hav e  no accide nt free 
period ; in its first year of operatio n ,  it would bear the accident 
co sts that th e or iginal company caused in the first year of its 
operation but which did not accrue until later . And i f ,  when these 
accide nt co sts are taken into account , the original company would have 
negative value , so also the successor would probably have negative 
value . Hence , if the successor operated at al l ,  it would sel dom be 
with the original company ' s  asse ts .  Rather , the successor would 
purchase new capi tal , to obtain i t s  own accident free period . If th e 
original company ' s  marke t for i t s  used asse t s  were l imited to other 
companies in the same busine s s , the original company thus seldom would 
have a marke t ;  th e weal th i t  would lose to victims would commonly 
equal or iginal moni es exp e nded p l us goodwil l .  If the original 
company ' s  asse ts could be used in a different busine s s , a successor 
might earn enough wi th them to be a posi tive val ue co ncern , de spite 
bearing its pr edecessor ' s  ac cident co st s ;  but because the asse ts are 
bur de ne d  by these co sts , the succe ssor wil l pay less for them than 
th ei r earning power alone would warrant . To pay les s  for the as se ts ,  
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as sai d  above , wil l increase the original company ' s  weal th that is at 
risk to victims and thereby decr ease the l ikel ihood that the firm wil l 
operate without insurance . 
Successor l iability unfor tuna tely is less effective in 
practice than th is analysis suggests . Some states do not impose i t  
even when th e successor uses t h e  assets to make the same product as 
the . original company ; most states do not impose i t  if asse ts are sol d 
for cash rather than stock ; and no states impo se it if the successor 
use s the asse t s  to produce a different product than the or iginal 
company . 3 4
( c )  Bankrup t cy 
An entrepreneur would operate a nega tive value firm even were 
l imited l iabil ity abol ished and succe ssor l iabil ity complete , if sh e 
could function until accide nt co sts began to accrue and then have al l 
such co sts--the entire del ayed risk--di s charged . Current law 
precludes th is strategy ; the weigh t of authority holds that tor t 
cl aims base d on harms that have yet to material ize cannot be asserted 
in bankrupt cy . 3 5 Claims that canno t be asserted cannot be discharged . 
( d )  Legal Implica tions 
Relatively minor changes in corporate law would prevent 
e ntr epr eneur s from operati ng firms that fail to insur e ful ly against 
knowabl e tor t risks . One such change is to abolish limited l i abil ity 
when a firm ' s  asse ts ,  including insur ance asse ts ,  are insuf ficient to 
sati sfy tor t cl aims and : ( i ) The firm knew or shoul d have known that 
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it faced a posi tive probability of incur ring a tort liabil i ty that 
would exceed its weal th ; and ( ii )  if potential victims bargain with 
i t ,  they are uninformed . The second condi tion ac tual ly is 
unnecessary , for the burden of the reform sugge sted here is to abol ish 
limited l iability whenever the tort system j ustifiably would hold the 
firm liable ; and its rationale is that , as regards knowable risks , a 
firm ' s  assets wil l be insuf ficient to meet tor t claims only because 
i ts owners del iberately chose to operate in that way--to earn profits 
by externalizing risks . Also , th e phrase "abol ish limited liabil i ty "  
i s  used here a s  a shor thand for the congi eres o f  civil remedies that 
the recent l iterature advocates to e ffectively impose tor t or 
environmental risks on firms , such as holding the officers l iable3 6  or
hol ding the owners in propor tion to their capi tal contribution. 3 7
This paper ' s  concern i s  not so much with how best t o  relax traditional 
corporate protec tions but with when they shoul d be relaxed . 
As an exampl e  of what I have in mind , the Johns-Manville 
Company once considered putting i ts asbestos related activities into a 
separately incorporated division . Such a stratagem shoul d fail for 
harms traceable to sales made after the asbestos risk became knowable .  
Had Johns-Manville pursued i t ,  it shoul d have been made to satisfy al l 
liabi l i ty judgments for such sales that its subsidi ary could not 
satisfy . Otherwise , such use of a subs idiary , or of "unrelated " 
divisions of a conglomerate , would wrongfully permit a company to 
external ize risk to victims . 
Successor l iability al so should be made complete for knowable 
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risks . Any purchaser of the bulk of a firm ' s  asse ts should be l iabl e  
for i ts tor ts . An objection to this proposal is that it woul d inject 
uncer tainty into marke t s  for capi tal asse ts ,  but this obj ection seems 
fal se . A succe ssor often wil l use the asse ts to make the same product 
as i ts prede cessor . If the risk is knowable to the lat ter , it will be 
knowable to the former , for the successor can learn bo th the rate at 
which ac cidents happen and i t s  predecessor ' s  sales history , and so be 
able to cal culate its ac cident exp o sur e . In this ci rcums tance , 
succe s sor l iabi l i ty only transfers risk from product and labor 
marke ts , where potential victims presumably canno t value i t ,  to 
capi tal marke ts , where firms presumably can .  The rule shoul d b e  the 
same when th e purchaser plans to use the asse ts for a different 
purpose than the sel ler . If th e risk is knowable to the latter , it 
can be knowable to th e former , and agai n  the successor can learn its 
predecessor ' s  sales history . Also , to make an exception for 
"unr elated busine s s "  is to assume the expensive and i tsel f  uncer tainty 
producing task of deci ding what act ivities are unrelated . 3 8  Since the 
succe ssor can insist on an indemni fica tion clause or the l ike , it 
seems be st to make successor l iabil ity complete . 
If l imi ted l iabil ity is abol ished , succe ssor l iabil ity is 
complete and contingent tor t claims cannot be dis charged in 
bankruptcy , 3 9  a firm could not shift delayed , knowable risks to
victims . Corporate and ba nkruptcy law thus would func tion to advance 
the goals that products l iability law shoul d serve . 40 
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�. Remote Risks 
Part I showed th at cour ts could distinguish adequa tely between 
remote and knowable risks , and that impo sing all risks on firms would 
not enlarge the se t of dangers that firms would discover . 
Consequently , rules that do impose al l risks cannot be justified on 
efficiency or safety grounds . Such rules , however , may be imp l ied by 
mor al or distributional goal s .  Par t III considers this possibi l i ty .  
Part I IB shows first that subs tantial efficiency co s t s  are cr eated by 
remote risk impo si tions . 
Firms wil l underinsur e remote risks . A risk is l ikel y  to be 
r emote , Par t I showed , if m, the mean of the profit distribution from 
sal e of a product ,  is relatively high and a, the distribution ' s  
standard deviation,  is smal l .  These conditions can b e  satisfied in 
two ways . First , the firm plausibly bel ieves that the product will 
not cause high accident co sts at al l .  For exampl e ,  the firm expects 
accide nt co s t s  to range be tween $10 , 000 and $100 , 000 , The firm then
wil l not purchase mor e than $100 , 000 of insurance . If accident co sts
turn out to be $1 , 000 , 000 , the firm is underinsured . Seco nd , th e firm
can conceive of accident co sts as high as $1 , 000 , 000 but plausibly
bel ieves that these large losses are unlikely . In th is event , the 
firm also wil l be underinsur ed ,  though for a different reason : marke t 
insurance is overpriced . Insurance compani es seldom have ac tuarial 
experience of new pr oducts or do thei r own research . One possible 
strategy for such a company woul d then be to accept our il lustrative 
firm ' s  estimate of the odds ; in consequence , it would sel l th e firm 
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$1 , 000 , 000 of coverage at a l ow rate . This strategy could create a 
serious adverse selection probl em : firms with risky new products 
would por tray themsel ves to insur ance companie s  as selling safe new 
products : the companies , lacking research facilities , migh t  be fooled . 
Insurance companies , however , are aware of adverse selection problems . 
and so would pursue a different strategy : to charge relatively high 
rates until they had a contr ary accident experience . A f irm that 
bel ieved its product was quit e  unl ikely to cause serious accidents 
then would hav e  a strong incentive not to buy marke t insurance : 
rather , it would sel f  insur e for large , low probabil ity harms--th e  
$1 , 000 , 000 above--until it had e nough experience to conv ince a n
insurance company that its odds estimate w a s  correct . But for remo te 
risks , its estimate is fal se . For example , the firm may bel ieve that 
the $1 , 000 ,000 liabil ity would be incurred with probabil i ty 0 .0001 and
set aside $100 as a loss reserve , when that probability actual ly was
0 .01 , so th at $10 ,000 should hav e  bee n  set aside . Again ,  the firm is 
underinsur ed . 
To describe a risk as r emote is not to say that a firm had no 
idea at al l th at its product coul d cause great harm . A risk is r emote 
ei ther when a firm was this ignorant or bel ieved gr eat harm to be 
unl ikely , and r esearch to correct ei ther impr ession was not cos t  
justified . Firms can act only on the basis of what they be st bel ieve . 
Ther efor e ,  a firm th at is ignor ant of a risk ' s  true extent or 
underest imates the l ikel ihood that gr eat harm wil l occur is unl ike the 
firms described in Part IIA above : as we will see , thi s  former firm 
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cannot be given incentives to insur e ful ly . Also , when uni nsur ed 
products l iability co sts , alone or when adde d to a firm ' s  other debt s ,  
create a total l iabi l i ty that exceeds the firm ' s  weal th , the firm wil l  
adopt resource wasting strategies to avoid paying compensa tion . 
1 . Corporate Law
Part IIA argued that l imited l iabi l i ty should be abo lished and 
successor l iability made complete for knowabl e risks because then 
firms would have a greater incentive to act efficiently .  Efficie ncy 
meant pur ch asing ful l insurance . To see why these r eforms could not 
induce efficient behav ior for remote r isks , recal l that a firm 
actual ly has two decisions , whe ther to insur e and how much insur ance 
to buy . When a firm ' s  large st expected l iabil ity is less than i t s  
weal th , th e f i rm  always wil l insur e ( or not operate ) .  When the 
larges t  expe cted l iabil ity exceeds its weal th , the firm wil l operate 
without insurance if to do so wil l generate higher expected earnings . 
Whe ther it wil l or not ,  in tur n ,  is impor tantly a function of the siz e  
o f  the difference be tween the largest expected l iability and the
weal th victims can reach ; th e smal ler is this difference , the less 
likely is i t  th at operation without ful l insur ance is profit 
maximiz ing . Abol ishing l imited l iabil ity and extending successor 
liabil i ty increase the amount of weal th that an entrepr eneur must put 
at risk t o  vic tims and therefor e shrink the difference be tween thi s  
weal th and the largest expected liabil ity . As a co nsequence , these 
reforms would make i t  less l ikely that a firm woul d operate without 
insurance , whether risks were knowable or remote . 
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A firm that is induced to insure , however , wil l  buy coverage 
against the l argest expected liability that it  antic ipates . Since the 
firms modeled in Part IIA were assumed to have correct expectations 
respe cting this l iabil ity , they th en would purchase the correct 
coverage . But to say that a risk i s  r emote is to say that the firm 
had false expectations : as we have just see n ,  the firm either had no 
i dea at al l th at accident co sts could be as high as they turned out to 
be or badly underestimated the l ike l ihood of these high co st s .  Though 
the incentive of such a firm to insure could be increased by 
abol ishing l imited liabil ity and extending successor liabil ity , the 
firm could not be made to insure correctly . 
In additi on , to adopt these reforms when risks are remote 
would have subs tantial efficiency cost s .  Respecting the abol ition of 
l imited l iabil ity , entrepreneurs de ci ding to star t firms would have an 
incentive to conceal their weal th from po tential victims ,  for 
otherwise th ey could unexpectedly lose al l .  The costs of conceal ing 
weal th are a dead weight loss . Also , potential investor s  in firms 
would have an incentive to moni tor the weal th of other po tential 
investor s ,  to ensur e that th ese shareholders were sufficiently rich so 
th at no one shareholder would bear a di spropor tionate share of 
liabil ity cost s . 41 This moni toring too is a dead weight loss . 
Final ly , investment in firms that produce toxic substances will itse l f  
b e  reduced : 42 i t  would become mor e  risky t o  contr i bute equi ty t o  such 
a firm , since th e investor ' s  personal weal th could be unpredi ctably 
destroyed . Because toxic subs tances such as drugs produce social 
so 
benefits , decreased production of them would create wel far e  losse s . 
Expanding succe ssor l iabil ity for remote risks would create 
uncertai nty in the marke t for used corporate asse t s , which coul d 
significantly reduce sales . Possible buyers woul d be de terred because 
purchase would subj ect their companies to l iteral ly unpredictabl e ,  
po ssibly large claims . 
On the oth er hand , if the victims of remote risks are l imited 
to a firm ' s  asse t s , they wil l often be undercompensa ted , for the firm 
is underinsured . Hence , should the case for imposing remote risks 
rest largely on the ne cessity of compensating victims , that case is 
seriously compromised i f  limited liability and successor l iabil ity are 
retained in th ei r current form . To decide what should ul timately be 
done , the n ,  requi res an analysis of the mor al case for compensa tion , 
which is made below . The argument here shows only that pursuing this 
case through the vehicle of cor porate law reform is l ikely to generate 
substantial inefficiencies , 
i .  Insolvency and Inefficiency 
A firm may have negative value because it  is made to bear 
del ayed , remote risks . If so , it is i nsolvent in the balance sh eet 
se nse ; its l iabil ities , including tor t  l iabil ities , exc eed i t s  asse t s . 
But th e firm is not nece ssarily insolvent in the equi ty se nse because 
it  may be abl e to pay its debts as they mature ,  at least for a time . 
When equity insolvency has not arrived , a firm has a choice whether to 
dissolve or continue . This choice permits i t  to pur sue either of two 
inefficient strategies , to l iqui da te when the firm ' s  goi ng concern 
value exceeds i ts l iquida tion value or to do negative ne t present 
value projects with high early payouts . These strategies sometimes 
permit firms to create gains for current claimant s--the debt and 
equity--at the expense of future claimants--the victims of remote 
risks . Under current law .  the future claimants can block nei ther 
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strategy because they have no say in a firm ' s  operation . Subsection 
2 ( a ) illustrates when a firm may liquidate inefficiently;  2 ( b )  
il lustrates the adoption of negative value pro j ec t s . 43 Readers
uninterested in the de tails may skip to 2 ( c )  and 2 ( d ) , which summarize 
the data , show that current corpor ate and bankruptcy law permit bo th 
strategies , and argue that the strategies are difficult to prevent 
under any conceivabl e se t of reforms . 
( a )  An Inefficient L iquidation 
Consider a firm with this balance shee t : 
Asse ts 
Cash = 0 
Present Value = $600 , 
Viewed as : 
PV = $600 + . S ( $300)  + . S ( -$300)
= $600
Liquida tion value = $soo 
L iabil ities 
Bank debt = $300 at nine percent
Period One Liability = $ 27 
Period Two Liability = $3 27 
Period One Claims : 
( a )  General = $so 
( b )  Tor t  = $so 
Period Two Cl aims Expected : 
( a )  General = $ SO 
( b )  Tor t = $400
The firm may liqui date at once , after the first $so of tor t claims 
tel l that it is balance sheet insolvent ( firm value is $600 ; firm 
liabil ities are $777) , or it may operate for one period . If it 
liquida tes , it pays current general claimants $so . current tor t 
S 2  
claimants $ so ,  i t s  bank $3 27 dol lars and i t s  shareholders $7 3 , the 
amount left from the $ soo liquidation value . 
The bank and shareholders could only do worse on continuance . 
The firm ' s  $ 600 present value is conceptualized as a sure receipt of
$600 in period two plus a O . S chance of earning or losing $3 00 from
future operations ; this treatment is adopted to show that future 
operations have risk . The certain value to the bank from continuance 
is  $27 , its first year interest . The bank ' s  expected value from
continuance is $226 . S O , calculated as fol lows : The firm has a O . S 
chance of having only $3 00 of weal th in period two ( $600-$300) . In
this event , $3 00 wil l remain to pay claims . As the bank is then owed
$3 27 and there wil l be $7 7 7  of claims , the bank would receive 42'o of
$3 0 0  or $1 26 . Hence , the bank has a o . s chance of ge tting $126 , which
is wor th $63 � ante . Were the firm instead to be worth $ 900 in
period two , the bank would be paid in ful l ;  a O . S chance of receiving 
$3 27 is valued at $163 . 90 � ante . The sum of these al terna tives is
$226 . SO . The total value to the bank from conti nuance is the expected
value of $226 . S O  plus the sur e $27 , or $2S3 . S O . This is  less than the
$3 27 the bank would receive on liquida tion,  so it would refuse to make 
fur ther loans and urge the firm to dissolve . 
The equi ty would agree . Were the firm to continue , there is a 
O . S chance it would have only $3 00 of wealth in period two ; then its
debts would exceed its asse ts and its equi ty would be wor thless . Were 
the firm instead to have $ 900 , its asse ts would exceed its l iabilities
by $1 23 ( $900-$777) ; a O . S chance of receiving $1 23 in period two is
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worth $ 61 . 50 . Hence , the expected value to the equity from 
continuance is 0 . 5 ( 0) + 0 . 5 ( $123 ) = $61 . 50 .  Since the shareholders
receive $73 on l iquidation, they too wil l  want to dissolve . Enough
funds are available on l iquidation to pay the other current claimants ,  
and the futur e claimants have no say . Consequently , the firm wil l  
vanish . 
Liquidation is inefficient because the firm ' s  going concern 
value exceeds its liquidation value by $100 . Also , since cour ts
impose unknowable risks largely to compensa te victims , and since 
future claimants wil l receive nothing , liquida tion has moral cost s . 
Here too the future claims actual ly had value . If the firm continued 
and was wor th only $3 0 0  in period two , the future claimants would be
enti tled to 5 1 . 5  percent ; if the firm instead was wor th $ 900 , the 
future claimants would be paid in full . As there is a O . S chance of 
ei ther outcome , the expected value of conti nuance to them is $27 7 . 2 5 . 
Liquidation dissipates some of this value and transfers the rest to 
current claimants . In theory , the future claimants could bribe the 
debt and equi ty to continue ; the former would be made be t ter off by a 
payment of at least $73 . 5 1  and the latter by a payment of at least
$1 1 . 51 . The futur e claimants could make bo th payments and still hold
cl aims whose expe cted ne t value is $ 1 92 .23 . Subsection 2 ( d )  wil l 
show , however , that coal ition costs and freerider problems would 
pr event the futur e claimants from bribing the firm to conti nue , 
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( b )  Adopting Nega tive Value Proj ects 
The liquidation il lustration was more favorable to tor t  
claimants than real life sometimes is because it assumed that firms 
would take no steps to reduce their l iquidation value or to increase 
the total claims on i t . This assumption may sometimes be fal se when 
an entrepreneur discovers that he has i nadvertently been operating a 
negative value firm . Consider a proj ect that wil l generate $200 in
ne t revenue per year for two years but require a $ 500 payout in the
third year . If the firm ' s  cost of capital is ten percent , the 
proj ect ' s  net present value is a minus $2 8 . 83 . The entrepreneur 
neverthless might cause the firm to do the proj ect if maj or tor t 
claims would mature in th e third year ; he would pocke t $400 and then
l iquidate the firm . The futur e claimants would have to share the 
liquidation value with the artificial ly created $ 500 claimant . 
Alterna tively ,  a firm may harvest natural resources earl ier than it 
should .  For example ,  let a firm own a mine that will produce $ 5 , 000
of coal if it is mined today ; the firm expects coal prices to rise in 
response to rising oil prices but then level off . Its discount rate 
is ten percent , and i t  bel ieves that the coal wil l yield $7 , 000 if
mined in a year , $8 , 500 if mined in two years , $ 9 , 500 if mined in
three years and $ 10 , 000 if mined in four years . Then , the firm should 
mine the coal in the third year because the present discounted value 
of th at yield is $7 , 1 42 . 86 ,  which is greater than the present
discounted value of any other yield . But if maj or tort claims will 
accrue in th e third year , the firm wil l mine in the second , which does 
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not maximize value . 44  
Such inefficient proj ects some times are avail abl e .  One 
example i.s borrowing . which brings in money at once and requires later 
payouts .  Lenders , however , may also discover that the firm is 
insolvent . A more real istic example would be for a firm to engage in 
a natural resource business that has a reclaimation obligation that 
the firm plans not to meet . For instance , a firm might strip mine 
coal for a time , planning not to reconstruct the l and . Mor e simply ,  a 
firm when calculating a project ' s  value should include the cost of 
replacing necessary machines . A negative value proj ect can thus 
become posi tive if no replacement cost is assumed . Firms that plan to 
dissolve wil l not assume replacements .  Thus , they may exhaust present 
or new asse t s ,  vanishing when these are gone . 
( c )  Data 
Current claimants on a firm that learns ex post that it has 
negative value have incentives either to liquida te the firm though its 
going concern value exceeds its liquida tion value or to have i t  pursue 
inefficient proj ects with high early payout s .  Until recently , few 
firms have been in this si tuation,  and these seem not to have been 
systematically studied . The anecdo tal evidence , though , is co nsistent 
wi th the story . A group of current claimants against Johns-Manv ille 
have asked the bankruptcy cour t to l iquida te the company , though 
management claims that its going co ncern val ue exc eeds its l iquida tion
value ; rather , management ' s  hope seemingly is to have the bankruptcy 
court el imina te or subs tantial ly reduce the future claims . 4 5 The 
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cour t ' s  apparent lack of sympa thy with this hope seemingly underlies 
the frequent claims that the company is stalling--refusing to propose 
a reorganiz ation plan while continuing to  use the protection of the 
bankruptcy cour t .  Respecting possible motives for a stall , Johns­
Manville has been accused of paying unusual ly high dividends , which 
redistribute wealth in favor of current claims and against future 
ones . Also , it al legedly is overcutting timber . This may be because 
i t  has no intention to replant , in which case it may be pursuing a 
negative value proj ect with a high current payout ; or it may be 
because it is harvesting too early , which also is inefficient . 46 The 
plausibil i ty of the story told above together with evidence of this 
sort suggest at least the provisional accuracy of a prediction that ex 
pos t  negative value firms wil l be run inefficiently .  
( d )  Legal Remedies 
Current law cannot prevent inefficient liquida tions when firms 
can pay off existing claimants .  Today , a firm can l iquidate privately 
or in bankruptcy . The latter route is open because futur e claimants 
now lack standing in bankruptcy proceedings , and so could not 
intervene to ask bankruptcy judges to require reorganization--1.� • •
conti nuance--rather than permit liquida tion . The future claimants 
could be given standing in bankruptcy but , as Professor Rowe 
recognized , no way now exists to get equity solvent firms into 
bankruptcy if they do not want to go there . 47 If such firms could do
bet ter by liquidating privately than by being forced to continue , they 
would pay off current de bt and vanish . 
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Future claimants could be authorized to trigger bankruptcy 
proceedings rather than wai t for them . Too few claimant s  would take 
up the chance , however , to make this reform helpful . The se t of 
future claimants is composed of persons who have been expo sed to toxic 
substances .  These persons woul d often regard the certain co sts of a 
lawsui t to force a bankruptcy as higher than the uncer tain gains . 
These gains are uncertain for three reasons . First , persons exposed 
to toxic substances suffer harm with a probability that is less than 
one and difficul t to calculate precisely .  Also , the harm wil l occur
an unde termined time in the futur e .  The gain t o  a future claimant 
from bringing a suit cannot exceed the expected value of his injury ; 
when the probability and timing of inj ury are bo th uncer tain so also 
is this expected value . Seco nd , the expected value of the inj ury is 
higher than the expected gain that would be real ized in bankruptcy . 
The value of a bankruptcy claim is partly a function of how many such 
claims there are . When a firm has a mil lion dollars in asse ts and two 
million dollars in claims , each claim is wor th seventeen percent more 
than if the asse t value were unchanged but there were three mil lion in 
cl aims . A fut ur e claimant would seldom know how many other such claims 
there wer e ;  hence , he would have difficulty valuing his claim in a 
bankrupt cy , even if he could calculate its expected val ue independent 
of bankruptcy . 4 8 Final ly , a future claimant , who is a consumer or 
worker , could not easily know whether the firm could pay his claim , 
which might be smal l or arise earl y ,  though the firm could not pay 
al l .  To force a bankrupt cy , a future claimant would have to incur 
certai n  expenses . That is , he would have to pay lawyers to bring a 
lawsui t that the firm would strongly contest . The very uncertain 
value of the gains from such a sui t often may seem lower than these 
expenses . 4 9 
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I n  addition , t o  force a bankruptcy i s  t o  provide a publ ic 
good . Once a bankruptcy has been triggered , no future claimant could 
be excluded from it , whether he contribu t ed to the trigggering l aw 
suit or not . When the costs of a bankruptcy sui t exceed the expected 
gain to any individual claimant from bankruptcy , no bankruptcy would 
occur , even if future claimants could value thei r cl aims accurately . 
Rather , a sui t would be brought only if a claimant coal ition could be 
formed .  The large number of futur e claimants ,  the difficulty of 
identifying them and of communication among them , and the incentive of 
each to let others finance the law suit make effective coalition 
formation unl ikely . 5 0  And without such a coal ition, future claimants 
also would not bribe firms to continue though their going concern 
value exceeds their liquidation value . 
For al l of these reasons , few futur e claimants would attempt 
to force bankruptcies or otherwise prevent firms from dissolving . And 
those that made de termined effor ts could be bought off .  Hence , 
al lowing futur e claimants to trigger bankruptcies would seldom prevent 
inefficient liquida tions . 
Allowing a public agency to force bankruptcies may have a 
bet ter chance of success , but not much be tter because the agency often 
would not know when to act . Future claimants would have to come 
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forward t o  notify the agency ; doing this raises many of the problems 
j ust discussed ,  for the future claimant actually is a person ,  who may 
be reluctant to become involved in an admini strative proceeding when 
he is now heal thy and may never suffer . The experience of the FTC and 
Justice Department in attempting to prevent rather than undo 
noncompe ti tive mergers al so suggests that a public agency cannot be 
effective unless firms are required to report extensively to the 
government about propo sed and present business activities . The marke t 
anticipates many of these activities ,  yet the firms that they would 
adversely affect seemingly lacked a sufficient incentive to notify the 
rel evant government agencie s .  Also , the sanctions for failing to 
repor t are imposed on the offending f irms . When firms are vanishing 
rather than continuing , however , sanctions for failing to report to a 
Federal agency their plans to vanish would be difficult to apply . 
Thus , a Federal agency too would seldom prevent inefficient 
liquidations . 51  
( e )  Concluding Remarks 
Impo sing remote risks on firms generates parti cular efficiency 
cost s ,  but these co sts are not enti rely absent when courts impose only 
knowable risks . A firm may fail to do the optimal amount of research ; 
if so , it may warn inadequately and underinsure . When the knowabl e 
risk materializes , this firm too wil l face large uninsured liabil ities 
tha t  create incentives to l iquida te inappropriately or wast e  weal th . 
However , the sanctions that now follow from knowable risk imposi tions , 
together with those that would fol low from adoption of the reforms 
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Part IIA suggest , would ensure that there would be few such firms . In 
contrast , the particular efficiency co sts that Part IIB describe are 
the inevitable accompaniement of remo te risk imposi tions , for firms 
cannot insure against remote risks and so would have incentives to act 
inappropriately whenever these risks material ize .  
III . The Case for Not Impos ing Remote Risks 
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The case against judicial impo sition of remote risks on firms 
fol lows from two basi c assumptions . The first is that misfor tune s 
which "life" visits on pe ople should not be sh ifted directly to other 
people ( or to firms ) unless "good reasons " exist to sh ift them . Life 
obviously is partly co nstituted by human actions . And the good 
reasons can be instrumental--shifting losse s  i s  efficient--or moral--a 
parti cul ar se t of unfor tuna tes has a right to have others bear losses 
that first fal l on them . The col lectivity of co urse may have duties 
of justice or be nevolence to unfor tuna tes , but pr ivate citiz ens , it is 
assumed , canno t  be made to bear the ful l burde n ,  unl ess good reasons 
exist . One justification for this as sumption is that shifting losses 
is co stly . Costs should not be incurred wi thout good cause . A second 
justification fol l ows from our society ' s  respect for and protection of 
individual autonomy . Such a commit tment to individualism implies that 
a person ' s  misfor tune is his or her own affai r ,  unless good reasons 
exist to make it another ' s  affai r .  The se cond assumption follows from 
the view th at at least some mor al duties are derivabl e from role 
expecta ti ons . What a parent shoul d do , th at is , fol lows in 
considerable part from what our socie ty expects parents to do . 52  And 
th e se cond assumption is that a corporati on ' s  rol e is to maximize 
profits , subj ect to its obeying the law and sa ti sfying widely ac cepted 
mor al constraints . 
These as sumptions are so de eply embedded in our cul tur e that 
rejecting th em would cr eate maj or social dislocations . I shal l rather 
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take them to hol d ,  and claim that they imply a prohibition agai nst 
cour ts impo sing r emote risks on firms . The first assumption alone can 
suppor t th is claim , for Part III argues that no good reasons exi s t  to 
shift losse s tr aceable to remote risks from unfor tuna tes to firms . 
Indeed , good r easons exi st not to . I have just shown that imposing 
r emote risks has substanti al efficiency co sts . Also , the second 
assumption implies th a t  a sh ift would be unfai r .  A firm would not 
have ac ted immorally in fail ing to dis cover a r emote risk : discovery 
woul d  not have been profit maximizing , nor do positive l aw or wide l y  
accepted moral notions direct firms to lose money at r esearch . 
Conseque ntly , to impo se r emote risks on firms is unfai r  because the 
firms are in justi fiabl e ignorance of them . This fairne s s  concern is 
heigh tened i f  cour ts be come serious about impo sing r emote risks , 
because th en they should abolish l imited l iabil ity and ext end 
successor l iabil i ty . These actions would impose co sts on shareholders 
and o ther firms--purchasers of corporate asse ts--who would sel dom have 
had a voi ce in th e original decision to produce . Thus , Part III 
conc ludes , good reasons actual ly exist no t to impose remote risks , and 
no good reasons exist to impose them . 
!· Ins trumental Ground s 
Products liabil ity law holds firms l i abl e to r educe accident 
co sts and facil itate loss spr eading . Part I showed that cour ts coul d 
distingui sh adequately between knowabl e and remo te risks and that 
firms required to bear only the former woul d discover no fewer dangers 
than firms wh ich bor e  th e latter ; indeed , they migh t discover more . 
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I n  add i tion , to impo se remote risks some time s  may inefficiently drive 
firms out of busines s .  This could o ccur when a remo te risk 
material izes such that victims ' cos t s  exceeded the value of firms in a 
marke t ,  bu t the product is viable with warni ngs . Viabi l i ty is possible 
if pe cul iarly sensi tive persons could avoid expo sur e and o thers could 
take appropriate pr ecautions . 53 The n  the product should continue to 
be produced with warnings , but the firms original ly in the marke t are 
insolvent and may dissolve . Oth er firms will then enter , but these 
entry co s t s  are a waste ,  for the original firms could hav e  continued 
to produce had they been made only to warn after the risk became 
knowable . Thus , impo si ng r emote risks doe s  not advance and may 
actual ly frustrate the goal of reducing accident co st s . 
The damage judgments flowing from remote risks also are not 
spr ead ; rather , they represe nt direct transfers from shareholders to 
victims . Loss spr eading is justi fied on prospective grounds . A firm 
wil l insur e against risks and pass part of the insurance cost to 
users . I n  th is way , as cour ts often say , losses are borne by those who 
benefit from the product , the firm and i t s  customers . Because firms 
have not insured ful ly against remote risks , they cannot spr ead th e 
losses from them in this fash ion . 
Cour ts sometimes sugge st th at firms will refl ect the cost of 
judgments for remote risks in future price s . 5 4 Were th is true , at
least par t  of the normative case for loss spreading would have to 
ch ange , for those who benefited from the product that caused harm , the 
past users , would pay nothing , wh il e those who did not be nefit , the 
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future user s ,  would be l argely responsibl e .  But in fac t  the co st of 
past judgments wil l not be r efl ected in future prices at al l .  A co st 
change wil l not affect price unless it  causes a firm ' s  marginal co st 
curve to shift . When a firm discovers that it must make a se t of 
liabil ity payments to remote risk victims , it incurs an immediate 
cos t , the present discounted value of the payment str eam . This cost 
is unr el ated to production,  and so wil l never shift the firm ' s  
marginal co st curve . 5 5  Hence , to impose on firms r isks that they
cannot profitably discover is to compel direct weal th transfers from 
shareholders to victims . The case for impo sing remote risks must rest 
on the moral desi rabi l i ty of these transfers . 56
�. Jus tice Grounds 
A tor t plainti ff may rest a claim for rel ief on any of three 
aspe cts of justice : r e tributive justice , which would suppor t impo sing 
l iabil ity to punish the defendant s ' s  morally culpable behavior ; 
distributive justice , which would suppor t impo sing liabil ity to 
produce a fairer distribution of weal th ; and corrective or 
compe nsatory justice , which would suppor t imposing l iabil ity to 
rectify a loss that the defendant wrongful ly cause d . A justice as 
retribution case seems groundless be cause a plaintiff woul d be suing 
in strict l iability , which doe s  not require a finding of faul t ,  let 
al one immoral faul t ,  to sus tain an impo sition of l iabil ity . 57 The
victim of a remote risk al so lacks tenable distributional and 
compe nsa tory justice claims . 
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( 1) Distributional Justice 
Cour ts de ciding products l iabil ity cases expl icitly refuse to 
justify out comes on distributional grounds . 5 8  Though th is de nial is
sometimes insincer e ,  it i s  always correct . To make out a 
distributional justice case , a claimant must show that an existing 
distr i bution of weal th should be al tered in his favor . A refusal to 
impose remote risks on firms benef its shareholders at the expe nse of 
vic tims . Hence , a victim mus t  cl aim that it is unj ust to burden 
victims as a class rather th an shareholders as a clas s ,  or that it  is 
unj ust to burden him rather than the particular shareholders of the 
firm he sue s . The former claim is weak be cause the classes victim and 
shareholder are too much al ike . Many shareholders are not rich and 
many victims are not poor . Also , many sh arehol ders are po tential 
victims ; a substantial por tion of firm weal th is held by employee 
pension funds and insurance companies . Fur ther , many victims have at 
least partial insurance whil e shareholders , � hypothesis , have none 
because th e risks were remote . Final ly , redi stributing weal th to 
victims cannot be justi fied by the notion that , o ther things equal , 
money should be transformed from large groups to smal l one s , if the 
smal l ones need hel p .  Often , a s  in the Johns-Manville case , the 
number of po tential victims may approximate the number of 
shareholders . Therefor e ,  a plainti ff ' s  claim for relief based on his 
membership in th e victim class does not implicate the justice of 
socie ty ' s  basic insti tutions in the way cl aims that weal th should be 
transferred from th e mor e  to the less wel l off do . 
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A victim mus t  instead argue that it  is unj ust for him rather 
than the par ti cular shareholders of the defendant firm to bear the 
co sts of a remote risk . Distriutional justice theories , however , do 
not suppor t such fine-grained distinctions among persons . Rawls ' 
theor y ,  for example ,  cl aims only that society ' s  "basic s tructure "  
should b e  just ; society should e nsur e a n  equal distribution of 
"primary " goods and that any other distinctions in the basic s tructur e  
a r e  t o  t h e  advantage o f  the wor s t  o f f  group . 5 9 The basic structur e  i s
compo sed o f  such principal insti tutions as "parl iament s ,  marke ts and 
systems of prope r ty " ;  these derive from "a public system of rul e s 11 • 6 0 
if the basic structur e is just , then i ndividual distinctions are 
likely to be made correctly . Rawls thus exp l icitly states that i t  is a 
"mistake " for a th eory of justice to consider the "rel a tive positions 
of individual s . "  
"If it is aske d  in the abs tract whether one distribution of a 
given stock of things to defini te individual s with known desires 
and preferences is be t ter than another , then there is simply no 
answer to th is question . 116 1 
Hence , a victim cannot justify a transfer from a parti cular se t of 
shareholders to himsel f  on Rawlsian grounds . 
Util itarian distributional th eories al so cannot justify such a 
claim . This is not because interpersonal uti l i ty comparisons be tween 
shareholders and victims cannot be made rigorously ; such comparisons 
may be made in an acceptably rough and r eady way , if one had e nough 
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information about t h e  parties ' par ti cular ci rcumstances . But ge t ti ng 
th is information in the context of l awsui t s  as these now are run i s  
difficu l t  t o  do . And t h e  effor t would also permit cour ts and other 
strangers to investiga te the personal l ives of litigants mor e 
thoroughl y  than current co nceptions of pr ivacy permit . Indeed , these 
privacy concerns imply that utilitarian distributional justice claims 
also are out of place when a parti cular individual claims money from 
another . Rather , util itarianism seems be tter sui ted to evalua ting 
society ' s  basic redistributional decisions . To do this requires 
interpersonal uti l i ty comparisons be tween large , disparate groups , 
such as rich and poor , that can be drawn on the basis of what people 
i n  general are l ike , and wi thout the particular personal information 
on which individual ized interpersonal util ity comparisons must rest . 6 2
( !) Compensatory Jus t ice 
The compensa tory justice approach to tor t law is concerned to 
compensa te only persons whose harms are causally linked to th e 
wrongfu l conduct of others . Those injur ed in this way have a righ t to 
redres s ; the injur ers h ave a duty to pay it . 6 3  A plaintiff must then
prove , to establ ish a compensa tory justice case for rel ief , that 
defendant caused his injury , and did so wrongful ly . Commentators 
sometimes claim th at these two element s are difficult to establ ish in 
the typi cal strict products l i abil i ty case . 6 4  Courts , however , use 
l anguage th at is consistent with the existence of a justice based view 
of stri c t  liabil i ty . I sh al l  first spel l  this case out for ordinary 
products l iabil ity claims , and then argue that while its causal aspect 
al so suppor ts imposing r emote risks on firms , its wrongful behavior 
aspec t  doe s  not . 
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I t  is useful to begin with the i s sue of a causal l ink be tween 
the defendant ' s  co nduc t  and the plaintiff ' s  harm . A se t of plausible 
causal candida tes usua l ly exists for complex events such as accident s ; 
the l aw ' s  task is to choose " the cause " from among this se t .  To do 
thi s  is to engage in what Mor ton White has cal led "causal 
interpretation . "6 5  Thi s  is a probl ematic enterpr i se , for , just as
several interpr etations of a novel can be "correct , "  in the sense that 
they log i cal ly fol low from admissibl e l iterary stance s ,  so al so 
several causal interpr etations of a complex event such as a war can be 
correct , in th e sense that they logical ly fol low from admissible 
interrogatory purpo ses . Also , just as there often i s  no principled 
way to choose among admissible l i t erary stances or interrogatory 
purpo se s , there of ten is no princi pled way to choose among causal 
interpretations . The enterprise of choosing " th e  cause " thus has an 
i rredu cibly arbitrary aspe c t . 
This difficul ty make s lawyers impa tient with causal analysi s ,  
but they never theless use i t ,  much i n  the way M .  Jourdan spoke prose . 
Causal interpretation is an ingrained par t  of the process of usi ng 
language to de scribe and explain events . And j udge s unsurprisingly 
hav e  intuiti ons about the causes of products liabil ity ac cide nts ; 
th ese intuitions are , as i t  wer e ,  part of the system ' s  raw ma terial . 
Hence , I shal l say a few words about causal analysi s ge neral ly and 
then attempt to identify the causal intuitions that seemingly are at 
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wor k in the case s . 
It helps to start with the notion of a minimal ly sufficient 
condi tion . Suppose that an appl iance in a private home sparks , se t s  a 
nearby flammabl e  cur tain on fire and ultimately the house is burned 
dow n .  Had the world run on from the moment before the appliance 
sparked , and had i t  not sparked , ther e would have been no fire . 6 6  But 
the same could be said for the pr ese nce of the flammable cur tain ;  had 
the wor l d  run on from the moment after the spark , and had there been 
no cur tain or had the cur tain not bee n  flammable ,  there al so would 
have bee n  no fire . Hence , at least the spark and the cur tai n are 
causal candidates for the fire , and by this logic so is the pr ese nce 
of oxygen in the ai r and the absence of an effective sprinkler system . 
On the other hand , houses can burn down if none of these causal 
candidates but oxyge n is pr esent . A gas heater coul d explode . 
This analysis can be formal iz ed to tell a causal story . Let E 
be th e event "house burned down at time t " ;  F be the "causal 
background " or "fiel d "  against which the story is played out ( th e  
fiel d include s such common featur es as t h e  pr esence o f  oxygen ,  that 
the house is on this planet , th at electricity runs through wires , and 
so for th ) ; A be th e sparking appliance ; X be the other causal 
candida tes present on the occasion at is sue ( the flammabl e cur tai n ,  
the absence o f  sprinkl ers ) ; Y b e  th e disjoint se t o f  other causes o f  a 
house fire not pr esent here ( the gas heater explosion ) .  Then we can 
wri te : ( a )  In F al l ( AX or Y )  are fol lowed by E ,  and ( b )  In F ,  al l E 
are pr eceeded by ( AX or Y ) . Here , the se t of events and states of the 
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wor l d  th at co nstitute "AX" agggrega te to a minimal ly sufficient
compl ex condition of the event E .  And Y al so would hav e  been a 
minimal ly sufficient condition of the event E ,  except that Y did not 
happen but AX did . 6 7
The parti cular factor A ,  the sparking appliance , is thus a 
necessary par t of the minimal ly sufficient co ndition AX of the fire , 
but the complex cond i tion is not itse l f  necessary to the event ; house s  
also can burn when gas heaters explode . Hence , A is what John Mackie 
cal led an "inus " cause of the fire . a necessary par t  of a co ndition of 
an expl anans that is sufficient but not necessary for the expl anandum 
to occur . 6 8  The flammable cur tai n ,  however , is also a part of X ,  and
thus it too is an inus cause . The difficul ty is to choose which of 
th em , or th e absence of sprinkl ers , is " the cause . "  
This choi ce can be made functional ly . If one ' s  obj ect is to 
reduce the frequency of the event to be explained , and if fewer such 
events would occur if appl iance s never sparke d ,  th en the sparking 
appl iance ( A )  is the fire ' s  cause . 6 9 Products l iabil ity law seeks to
reduce accide nt co st s . Therefor e ,  it could choose the cause in this 
fashion ; th at is , it could ide ntify causes on a cheapest co st avoider 
basi s ,  and cour ts often do pick causes in this way . But functionalism 
cannot exhaust the se t of causal explana tions here for two r easons . 
First , cour ts also use nonfunctional ist causal language ; a 
manufac turer is said to put a dangerous ar ticle in the str eam of 
commerce and , in consequence of doing this , is held liabl e .
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approach some times works at cross purposes with , and often seems to 
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proceed independently of , a cheapest co st avoider analysis . Second , a 
functionalist analysi s is irrel evant to the r emote risk i s sue , for the 
instrumental purpo se s that products l iabil ity law pursues--reducing 
accident co sts , spreading losse s--are not served by imposing r emote 
risks on firms . 
Another way to choose the cause from among a set of inus 
causes is to ask what the chooser wants to exp l ai n .  Most choosers 
want to exp l ain unusual or extraordinary things . I t  then fol lows , for 
example , th at the cause of a trainwreck "cannot be a normal or usual 
fea tur e of the operation of trai ns or of some particular tr ain • •
the cause of an abnormal event is i tsel f abnormal . ,,7 l But in what way 
is an event abnormal ? A person ' s  death may be abnormal to his friends 
if he were young and died in a car accident , ye t the death may be 
normal to a highway patrolman if it occurred a t  dusk a t  the end of a 
Labor Day weeke nd .  Because an event may be r egarded as abnormal in 
different ways , depending on one ' s  point of view , and because there 
may be mor e than one admissible point of view , an event may hav e  mor e 
th an one cause . The notion of cause as "abnormal ism " is neverthel ess 
constr ai ni ng , for few event s  can be r egarded as abnormal from a wide 
variety of viewpoint s . 7 2 The causal analysi s of everyday life , which
abnormal ism attempt s  to captur e ,  thus would make a causal attribution 
with virtual unanimity if the explanandum were "House s  on island al l 
washed away " and if the se t of inus causes in the relevant explanans 
included "Giant tidal wave . "  
An abnormalism theory of cause exp lains much in products 
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liabil i ty law . To see how , it is hel pful to borrow from Bruce 
Acke rman ' s  notion of l egal conversation . 7 3 Ackerman di stingui sh es 
between the conversations of "reactive"--he seems to mean 
traditional--and "activis t "  lawyers . The latter see a world that 
needs improvement ; they want to exp l ain its unsa tisfactory state as a 
step to reforming i t .  From this viewpo i nt , what is to be explained , 
to be talked about , is not so much an accident i t sel f as how the 
accide nt could have happene d . This l eads the activist lawyer to 
include as causes such features as the technology se t--the Government 
may not have funded safety research sufficiently--and the plaintiff ' s  
behavior--he could have discovered the need for a protective guard . 
A reactive l awyer supposes the wor l d  to be a satisfactory 
place , by and large . Serious personal inj uries are grotesque events 
in th is world : people do not and should not spend thei r time guarding 
against the grotesque . From this point of view , the thing to be 
explained is th e ac cide nt itse l f ,  which is conceived of as a sudde n ,  
viol ent rending o f  the social fabr i c . This choosing purpo se l eads the 
reactive lawyer to ask who and what tor e th ings up . I t  is then 
na tural to focus on the last de cisive event over which a person who 
was suppo sed to pay attention had a choi ce , rather than on the ful l 
se t of inus causes that an activist state could i nflue nce . 7 4  This
last , decisive event is the manufactur er ' s  conduct ; it is he who "put 
a defec tive arti cle into th e str eam of tr ade " ,  th ereby endangering the 
consumer "who was powerl ess to protect himsel f . " In effect , the 
manufacturer performed th e uncommon action of putting a bomb into 
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circulation . Hence , a reactive l awyer wil l choose the manufacturer ' s  
act of se lling a defective product as th e cause of an accide nt . 
An accident thus may have at least two cause s ,  that which an 
activist lawyer chooses and that which a r eactive lawyer choose s . 
Because bo th points of view are admissible in l egal discourse , each 
cause is , in an acceptable se nse , " th e  cause , "  This fact accounts for 
th e tende ncy of causal discussions to pass each other without making 
contac t . 7 5  But the que stion now is whether a nonfunctional causal
story exi st s .  And for reactive judges it doe s ; they plausibly bel iev e  
t h a t  sel ling defective products causes accide nt s . 
This causal interpr etation al so can ground ascriptions of 
responsibil i ty . 7 6 A ful l theory of responsi bil ity for the harms one 
causes would e nable us to link the causal story to a vari e ty of 
products liabil i ty rules , but we do not need that theory here . This 
is be cause any ful l theory would make the el ement of the 
manufactur er ' s choice an impor tant featur e ;  and this element has 
consi derable explana tory power . Choice is r el evant on the fol lowing 
argument : ( a )  To say th at a person is r esponsible for the harms he 
cause s is at least to say that he had a choi ce whether to cause the 
harms or not : ( b )  One has a choi ce only if one act s  under condi tions 
that insur e intentional ity ; ( c )  The most impor tant such condition for 
th e present purpose is th at the chooser was informed of the l ikely 
consequences of his act s ;  little or no moral weigh t attaches to 
choi ces made in ignor ance ; 7 7  ( d )  This condition is put too simply 
because one may choose to remai n ignorant . ye t persons canno t escape 
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responsi bil ity if they del iberately move forward whil e looking down ; 
( e )  Thus a person ' s  choice should be r egarded as uninformed , from a 
moral point of view , if and only if the person is ignorant in fact of 
the l ikely co nseque nce s of his acti ons and his ignorance is 
justifiabl e .  
I n  the ordinary strict liability case , a manufacturer i s  aware 
of th e accident causing propensi ties of its produ ct s .  When the 
manufacturer doe s  no t know , its ignorance is wi thout j usti fica tion . 
This fol lows from the defini tion of a knowable risk . A risk is 
knowabl e when the possible h arm that the firm could cause by sel ling 
th e produc t  was sufficiently great and l ikely as to exc eed the cos t s  
of a research proj ect t h a t  would hav e  disclose d  t h e  po ssibil i ty of 
th is degree of harm . Not to conduct a research proj ect in this 
circumstance is unj usti fiabl e .  This conclusion i s  impl ied by 
utili tariani sm , for r esearch coupled with a warning not only disclose s  
the harm bu t permits persons to avoid i t  o r  choose t o  risk i t ;  thus 
the rese arch proj ect maximiz es wel fare . A neoKantian analysis also 
r equires the firm to rese arch . A firm that do es not is wil ling to 
risk hur ting o thers when to discover the danger and warn woul d cost 
less than th e expected value of th e harm . Given this co st comparison ,  
many po tential vi ctims would pay t o  have th e research do ne . And the 
firm coul d charge th em for much of it because it  bargains with 
po tential victims and research co sts affect price s ;  th e firm , th at is , 
has r eason to believe th at to do research is to advance th e interest s 
of th ose to whom it sel ls , at not exce s sive cost to it . To omit 
research in th is event is to tr eat other s ' interests as unwor thy of 
serious concern .  For simil ar reasons , research i s  r equired by a 
firm ' s  social rol e . Society expects corpor ations to adopt those 
safety dev ices or issue those warni ngs for which peop l e  can be 
expected to pay . Presumably , persons would pay for the costs of 
research and disclosur e  when the harms they woul d incur by remai ning 
ignorant would exceed these co sts . Hence , firms should research in 
this ci rcumstance . 
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A manufactur er in the ordinary strict liabil i ty case thus has 
cause d harm and did so wrongful ly . Legal l iabil ity should a t tach to 
th is behavior because it is the function of civil cour ts to r edress 
inj uries that persons wrongfully cause , whe ther the causers meant harm 
or not .  Tor t s  are not crimes . 
The causal aspe ct of this compensa tory justice story al so 
suppor ts impo sing r emote risks on firms . Again ,  for a reactive lawyer 
the exp l anandum is th e sudden ,  unexpected and tragic fact of inj ury . 
And again th e de ci sive causal event is plausi bly seen as the act of 
sel ling dangerous th ings . Thus , the court in Beshada y. Johns­
Manville Products Corp . , 7 8  th e leading case to impo se r emote risks , 
responded to defendants '  claim th at it would be unr easo nable to 
require them " to warn of the unknowabl e "  with : 
However , a major concern of strict liabil ity--ignor ed by 
defendants--is the conclusion that i f a product was in fact 
defective , th e distributer of the product should compe nsa te its 
victims for the misfor tune that it  inflic ted on them . 7 9
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The sel lers caused the harm . 80 
The ascriptive aspe ct of this justice story is less easily 
made out for remote risks because firms sel l in justifiabl e ignorance 
of them . A risk is r emote when the possible harm that a product could 
cause is too little and too unl ikely to justify a research project to 
l earn any more about what the harm actually is . Not to do additional 
research in th is circumstance maximiz es wel fare . Also , eschewing 
research is not disrespectful to po tential victims . Were research 
done , the victims would hav e  to pay , yet they would not want to pay 
because , � hypothesis , the research is not wor th doing . To omit 
research th at no one wants is to fur ther rather than retard peopl e ' s  
concerns . Final ly , a firm ' s  social rol e  does not require it to take 
safety related acti ons that persons would be unwilling to pay for , if 
the persons knew every th ing th e firm did . Thus , firms are not 
responsible for the harms flowing from remo te risks because they do 
not responsibly choose to cause those harms . 
This argument may be put mor e graphical ly by co nsi dering a 
manufac tur er ' s  actual choice s . It can choose not to make the product 
though th e product is useful , seems safe , and therefor e has customers . 
I t  can warn th at the product is dangerous though no persuasive grounds 
to bel ieve th is exist and the warni ng wil l reduce sal es by frigh teni ng 
consumers without apparent cause . Or th e manufactur er can conduct a 
r ese arch program whose co sts exc eed its expected gains . In a world 
where firms are supposed to earn profits these do no t seem real 
choi ces . The Beshada cour t ,  ther efor e ,  unsurprisingly went on to make 
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an instrumentalist analysi s .  
The most impor tant inquiry , however , is whether impo sition of 
l iability for fai l ur e  to warn of dangers which were 
undi scoverabl e at the time of manufactur e wil l advance the goal s 
and policies sought to be achieved by our products l iabi l i ty 
rules . We bel ieve th at it wil l . 81
That the cour t go t this inquiry wrong 82 is less signi ficant than that
it bel ieved the inqui ry to be "The most impor tant " one . 
To summariz e ,  a manufac turer of a product that harms people in 
ways or to an extent th at the manufacturer canno t  be expected to 
for esee has caused th ese harms but , even to r eactive l awyers , is not 
r esponsi ble for them . Responsi bility implies choi ce , and i t  is the 
element of choice that remotene s s  eradica tes , For this r eason ,  no 
compensatory justice case for impo sing r emote risks exi s t s . 
�. The Humanitarian C laim 
A humani tarian claim to rel i ev e  needless suffering always 
exist s . Victims of remote risks needl essly suffer ; they too could not 
have discovered the danger and i t  harmed them . Humani tarian claims , 
however , are seldom vindica ted in law sui t s . There are too many of 
them and they make us al l defendant s . In a wor l d  of scarce resource s ,  
the questions they raise are how to rank the cl aimants ,  how much each 
of them should r eceive , and how much of the obl iga tion to give must 
each of us sa tisfy , None of these que stions is j usti ciabl e .  Are 
asbestos victims mor e deserv ing of rel ief than sickle cel l anemia 
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victims or tornado victims? Shoul d asbestos victims be given medical 
care only? Compe nsa tion for pain and suffering ?  Compe nsa tion for 
thei r dependents? If no one in parti cular is moral ly responsible for 
their pl ight but they hav e  moral cl aims against us al l ,  should cour ts 
al low victims to sue oil compani e s ?  Real estate tycoons ?  Union 
pension funds ? If it woul d be superroga tory for each of these 
po ssible defendants to co ntribu t e  thei r entire weal th to the rel ief of 
victims , how much shoul d they be made to pay ? No moral theories 
directly imply principled and relatively precise answers to these 
questi ons . Yet it is just such answers that this society want s  cour ts 
to give . Hence , the humani tarian case for rel iev ing the suffering of 
victims of remote risks cannot suppor t impo sing those risks on firms 
through the vehicle of product s  liabil i ty sui t s . 
To acknowledge the existence of a humanitarian case , however , 
is to reintroduce effici ency concerns , for some forms of publ ic 
funding conceivably could create resource misal loca tions th at exceed 
those that would flow from judicial impo sition of remote risks . Given 
the difficu l ty of quanti fying ei ther form of misal loca tion , general 
efficiency co ncl usions seem hard to draw . The assumption made in the 
Introduction to th is pape r ,  that society is o therwise wel l ordered , 
may be taken to imply that publ ic funding is done in such a way as to 
have no efficiency costs ; but th is implica tion may put more weigh t on 
the assumption th an it can bear . A mor e se nsi bl e way to proceed is to 
r ecogniz e  th at th e difficul ty just noted is unl ikely to be impor tant 
in practice , for the probabl e response of Congress in tor t risk 
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contexts woul d be to adopt a workman ' s  compensa tion sol ution , in whi ch 
firms have clearly defined obl iga tions to pay be nefits to a fund ( or 
purchase insurance ) ,  wor kers ' damages are explicitly limited and 
specified and th e Federal remedy is made exclusive . 83 Such solutions
in effect internal ize risk costs and make them predictabl e , and so 
should not cause serious misalloca ti ons . 
Conc lusion 
Cour ts shoul d not impo se r emote risks on firms . A remote risk 
i s  a risk whose ful l extent a cos t  justi fied r esearch program would 
not reveal . To impo se such risks is unfai r ,  for it makes firms 
responsible for what they would not pr event . Also , firms have 
incentives to pur sue inefficient str ategies , such as l iquida ting when 
thei r goi ng concern value exceeds thei r l iqui da tion val ue , just to 
avoid the surprising liabil ity tha t  a remote risk imposi tion creates . 
'lI'he use of th ese strategies apparently underlies the extraordinary 
probl ems th at bankrupt cy and corporate law face in si tua tions such as 
the asbestos disaster . These bodies of law can conveniently resol ve 
the probl ems th at products l iabi l i ty accidents create , when firms can 
anticipate the risk of those accident s . But cor porate and bankruptcy 
law could never cope with the chaos that can resul t when firms are 
made to bear large liabil ities for which they coul d not pl an . 
The fairness and efficiency obj ections to imposing r emote 
ri sks on firms imply the error of such impo si tions unless strong 
instrumental or justice reasons exist to hold f irms l iable . But there 
are no such reasons . Impo si ng r emote risks advances none of the 
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instr umental goal s  that tor t law pursues , nor is i t  impl ied by any 
justice based tor t theory . This is not to say that society owes no 
obligation to the victims of remote risks . Our country routi nely 
honors th e humani tarian cl aims of pe rsons harmed by unexpected 
disasters . The private law sui t ,  however , has traditionally been 
regarded as an impermissibl e method of meeting such obl igations . Th at 
the victims of some remote risks can conveni ently cast thei r claims in 
th e form of private law sui t s  is a co nti ngent fac t , not a 
justification for al tering this practice . 
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• Maur ice Jones , Jr . Professor of Law . Universi ty of Southern
Cal ifornia Law Center ; Professor of Law and Social Science , 
Cal ifornia Inst i tute of Technol ogy . Th is paper was improved by 
helpful comment s  made at a u . s. c .  Law Center Facul ty Workshop and 
a seminar concerning toxic risks held at the Cal ifornia Insti tute 
of Technology . The paper also be nefit ted substantial ly from 
conversations with Kim Border and J enni fer Rei nganum and from 
comments on prior drafts by Rober t  Bone , Jules Col eman , Rich ard 
Craswel l .  Thomas Jac kso n ,  Wil l Jone s ,  Stephen Hor se , George 
Priest , Steven Shavel l ,  Gary Schwartz , Mat thew Spi tzer and James 
Strnad . 
1 . The issue is new because under the old Bankruptcy Act one clearly 
coul d not be a tort credi tor until one had been injured . The 
defini tion of a provable cl aim has been expanded sufficiently in 
the new Code so that a possi bi l i ty exis ts that a claim for 
inj uries not yet incurred is provable .  See , � . g . , Jackson , 
Trans lating Assets and Liabilities to The Bankruptcy Forum, 
for thcoming , J.  Leg . Stud . ( 1 9 84 ) : Note , The Hanvi lle Bankruptcy : 
Treating Hass Tort C laims in Chapter 1 1  Proceedings , 96 Harv . L .  
Rev . 1 1 21 ( 1 9 83 ) :  Note , Mass Tort Claims and The Corporate 
Tortfeasor : Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative 
Compe nsat ion Versus The Common-Law Tort Sys tem, 6 1 Tex . L .  Rev . 
1 2 97 ( 1 983 ) . 
3 .
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subs tances in considerable de tail is Page , A Generic View of 
Toxic Chemicals .rul!J. Similar �. 7 Ecology L. Q, 2 07 ( 1 97 8) .
See al so Sympo sium , Federal Regulation of the C hemical Indus try , 
46 L .  and Cont . Problems 1-2 83 ( C . Schroeder ed . ,  1 983 ) . 
Many of Johns-Manvil le ' s  activities are described in Roe , 
Bankruptcy .rul!J. Tort : The Problem of the Hass Disas ter , 8 4  Colum . 
L .  Rev . 846 . 
4 .  Impo sing risks that firms did not anticipate al so produces 
strai ns in the civil litiga tion system . An industry has arisen 
to choose a dispute resolution system best sui ted to the asbe stos 
case s . See , � . g . , Rosenberg , The Causal Connec tion in Hass 
Exposure Cases : A "Mlli !&if" Vision of the Tor t System, 97 
Harv . L .  Rev . , p .  51 ( 1 984 ) : McGovern , Management of Multi-Party 
Tox ic Tor t  Litigation : Case !&if A!!!1. � Affec ting Case
Management , manuscript ( 1 9 83 ) . The civil litigation sys t em is 
not my co ncern , but that it is bei ng severely taxed is co nsis t ent 
with the view argued for here , that impo sing remote risks on 
firms creates substantial costs for many parties and the state . 
5 . Professor Epstein claimed that the asbestos companies 
legitimately failed t o  forsee the changes in produ c t s  liabil ity 
law . Eps t ei n ,  Hanville : The Bankruptcy of Produc t Liability 
!..Jllt , Regu lation , Sept . / Oc t . 1 982 at 14 . The retroactivity is sue
is examine d  in greater de tail in G .  Schwar tz , � Produc ts . Q!li 
Produc ts , Evolving !&if , Retroact ive !&if ,  5 8  N . Y . U .  L .  Rev . 7 96 ,
6 .
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81 3 -2 8  ( 1 983 ) . See also Graetz , Legal Transitions : The Case o f  
Re troac tivity in Income � Revis io n ,  1 26 U .  Pa . L. Rev . 47
( 1 97 7 )  • 
Another way to deal with product claims that arise years 
after sal e  is with statutes of limitation . Some of the new 
statutes that have been adopted woul d bar some toxic produc t  
claims . See , � . g . , S .  D .  Comp . Laws Ann . 8 1 5-2-1 2 . 1  ( Supp . 
1 982 ) ( six year statute for all claims ) . Other new statutes 
apparently would not . For example , the new Kansas statute is for 
ten years but does not apply "if the h arm was caused by prolonged 
exposure • • • or " the defect could not reasonably be dis covered 
in ten years , or "if the h arm caused within 1 0  years after • •
del ivery dlid not manifest itse l f  until after that time . "  Kan . 
Sta t . Ann . 8 60-3 3 03 ( Supp . 1 9 82 ) . The new statutes--there seem 
about twenty--are surveyed in D .  Noel and J ,  Phil lips , Produc t s  
Liabil ity Cases and Materials 7 95-96 ( 2d .  ed . 1 9 82 ) . These 
statutes are unpopular with cour ts , which have held some of them 
unconsti tutional . See Dworkin , Product Liability of the 1 980s : 
"Repose is_ Not the Des tiny" of Manu fac turers , 6 1  N .  C .  L .  Rev . 3 3  
( 1 9 82 ) . 
Cases that hold the manufac tur er ' s  knowledge of risk a t  the time 
of production to be irrelevant to the impo sition of l iabil ity are 
col lected in Wade , On The Effec t In Product Liabi l i ty o f  
Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing , 5 8  N . Y . U .  L .  Rev . 7 3 4 ,  
7 57 n .  83 ( 1 9 83 ) . See also 2 F rumer and Friedman , Products 
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Liability 8 1 6A [ 4] ( f) [ vi ]  ( 1 97 8) . An influential early argument 
for th is approach is Kee ton. Produc ts Liability-Inadequacy of 
Information , 4 8  Texas L .  Rev . 3 98 ( 1 97 0 ) . See also G .  Schwartz , 
Foreward : Understanding Produc ts Liability ,  6 7  Cal . L .  Rev . 43 5 ,  
4 82 - 8 8  ( 1 97 9) ; Calabresi , Concerning Cause and The Law of Torts , 
43 U .  Chi . L .  Rev . 6 9 ,  93 ( 1 97 5 ) . 
7 .  � . g . , Woodil l v .  Parke Dav is and Co . ,  5 8  I l l . App . 3 rd 3 4 9 , 3 7 4
N . E .  2d . 6 83  ( 1 97 8) . 
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See , � . g . , Beshada y .  Johns-Hanville Products Corp . , 90 N .  J .
1 91 ,  4 47 / A . 2 d  43 9 ( 1 9 82 ) ; Note , S t rict Liabi lity and The 
Sc ientifically Unknowable Risk , 97 Harq . L .  Rev . 6 6 0  ( 1 97 4) . 
See cases ci ted in the authorities col lect ed in note 6 ,  supra . 
1 0 .  � . g . , Borel y .  Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation , 4 93 F .  2d . 
1 07 6  ( 5th Cir . 1 97 3 ) . 
1 1 . The analysis that fol lows extends to the l iability context 
Roberts and Wei tzman , Funding Criteria For Research , Development 
and Exploration Pro jec ts ,  4 9  Eco nome trica 1 26 1  ( 1 9 81 ) . This is 
an unusual research and development model because it considers 
the strategy of a single firm . These mode l s  often are se t in a 
game theoretic framework , in which a firm does R and D in 
respo nse to R and D i ni tiatives of i t s  compe titors , or as a way 
to exc l ude rivals from a marke t ,  and so for th . See P .  Stoneman , 
The Economic Analysis o f  Technological Change 3 0-51 ( 1 983 ) . The 
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Roberts and Wei tzman model fits wel l here be cause toxi c 
substance s ,  by and large , are homoge neous and cannot be al tered ; 
hence , each firm in a marke t has the same research goal , to learn 
i t s  produc t ' s  true char acteristics . Thus l i t tl e  is lost by 
beginning wi th an analysis of a firm in isolation . Par t C then 
extends the analysis t o  a marke t context . Also , the analysi s 
here ignores issues of how knowledge of risk diffuses across 
firms , but rather assumes that when one firm discovers a risk ' s  
true extent , al l firms instanteously know of it . This assumption 
seems plausible because , as will appear , a firm that dis covers a 
risk ordinarily tr anslates this discovery into the warning i t  
publicly gives ; firms can co nveniently moni tor the public 
warnings of o ther firms . 
In tor t  law , the word "remote" is often opposed t o  
"proximate " ,  with the former conno ting an a t tentuated causal 
rel a tionship . The word remote is not used in this way here , for 
a toxic substance can cause serious harm . Rath er , as the 
analysis next shows , remote is used in this paper to describe 
risks whose existence or ful l extent a cost justified r esearch 
program would not uncover . 
1 2 .  A firm is liable for al l damage s if its warning is not 
appropriate to the degree of danger . See , �.g. , Salmon y. Parke , 
Davis and Co • •  520 F .  2d 13 5 9  ( 4th Cir . 1 97 5) . 
1 3 . See H .  J .  Moroney , Fac ts from F igures ,  62-63 ( 1 96 5 ) . The be nefit 
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distribut ion is normal if its mean changes roughly conti nuously 
wi th new da ta , which wil l occur i f  smal l amounts of information 
change bel iefs by a smal l amoun t . See Roberts and Wei tzman , 
supra note 1 1 , at 1 2 83 . The assumption of a normal distribution 
seems pl ausibl e for many research projec t s . 
1 4 .  This paragraph is fai rly technical . Readers uninterested in the 
derivation of the optimal stopping l ines can move to the next 
paragraph without losing the sense of the argument . 
1 5 .  See P .  Stoneman , supra note 1 1 , at 4 .
1 6 . This footnote is optional . A production function is homoge neous 
of degree k i f ,  given any po sitive constant t ,  
k F ( tK , tL )  = t F ( K , L) . Here K is capital and L is labor . The
equa tion says o nly that if value s were assigned to K and L in the 
production function F ( K , L) , and the entire func tion was 
mul tipl ied by th e constant tk , the product would equal the resul t 
if the func tion F ( tK ,  tL)  h ad been sol ved--if ,  that is , every 
individual element of this function h ad been mul tipl ied by the 
constant t .  There are i ncr easi ng  returns to scale when k is 
greater than o ne , decr easing r e turns when k is less than one . 
With co nstant re turns to scale k = 1 and so F ( tK , tL ) = tf ( K , L) . 
See J .  Quirk , Intermediate Microeconomics , 1 1 5-1 6 ( 1 97 6 ) . A 
function that has co nstant returns to scale is l inearl y 
homogeneous . We have wri t ten the production function for a 
r esearch project as V ( m , C ) . Hence ,  we can subs t i tute m for K ,  C 
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for L and A for t and write : m C V ( m , C )  = AV ( A 'A) for al l A > 0 ,
where A i s  a posi tive constant . Because thi s  equa tion holds for
al l value s of A >  O ,  we can let A = c .  Then V ( m , C )  = CV ( m/C , 1 ) . 
Define g ( m/C > = :v< m/C , 1 ) . Sol ving this yields mg ( m/C ) =
CV ( m/C , 1 ) . But we know th at CV ( m/C , 1 )  = V ( m , C ) , Hence , 
V ( m , C )  = mg ( m/C ) , which is the equa tion in the text . Because 
V ( m , C )  is linearly homogeneous , it describes a ray through the 
origin .  See D .  Mccloskey , � Apo lied Theory of � 4 8 8  
( 1 982 ) • 
1 7 . This footnote al so is optional . Roberts and Wei tzman firs t show 
that what we h ave cal led the slope parameters R and S are 
symmetrical about th e horizontal axis with S = -R . As these are 
probability distributions , it can be shown that 1 = g ( S) - g ( R ) , 
r_ Pr f Z  l S l ] 1 = E C Z I Z } S ] Ll - 2 Pr f Z  > S l 
� - -where Z - N ( a , a ) and a =  ac /C .  Doing comparative statics shows
that S increases when a incr eases or when C decr eases . See 
Roberts and Wei tzman,  supra note 1 1 , at 1 2 85 - 86 and 1 27 0 .  
1 8 .  See Bor el v .  Fibreboard Paper Products Corporatio n ,  4 93 F .  2d 
1 07 6 ( 5th C i r , 1 97 3) • 
1 9 .  See Bor el v .  Fibreboard Paper Product s  Corporation , supra note 
1 8 .  
20 . Thi s  paper does not treat the asbestos cases exhaustivel y ,  but a 
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gl ance a t  the da ta suggests the plausibility of a bel ief held 
before , say , 1 95 8 ,  that asbestos was not excessively dangerous a t  
common exposur e level s .  The first recommended Government 
standard for permissible amounts of asbestos in work env ironments 
was adopted in 1 93 8 .  This standard was much lower than the 
current standard , yet it was unch anged for over thirty years ; the 
static na tur e of the rule implies that l i t tle uncertainty exis ted 
respecting i t , In 1 96 8 ,  th is s tandard was lowered considerably 
for government contractors , to twe l ve fibers per cubic 
centime ter . In 1 97 2 ,  OSHA adopted a standard of five fibres per 
cubic centimeter , which was "intended primarily to protect 
empl oyees against asbestosi s " ;  "it was hoped that" the standard 
"woul d  provide some incidental degree of protection against 
cancer . "  7 8 Fed . Reg . 5 1 0 87 ( 4 Nov . 1 983 )  • OSHA did not 
regu l a te mor e  rigorously for cancer prevention because the 
relation be tween asbestos and cancer then was too obscur e . In 
1 97 6 ,  OSHA r educed the standard to two fibres per cubic 
centimeter . All of these standards were too low because "it was 
bel ieved that the smal ler fibres [ as smal l as one micron] would 
not be r etained in the lungs and therefore would not cause 
asbestosis . These shorter fibres are now known to cause 
asbestosis and cancer . "  Comment , Asbes tos Litigation : The Dus t 
Has No t Yet Settled , 7 Ford . Urb . L .  J .  5 5 ,  6 6-67 ( footnotes 
omit ted ) ( 1 97 8) . In 1 97 5 ,  OSHA proposed a reduction in the 1 97 2  
standard to . 5  fibres per cubi c centime ter ; that is , the 1 97 2  
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standard was in the middle 1 97 0 ' s  considered t o  be too leni ent by 
a fac t or of 1 0 ,  and the 1 96 8  standard was conside red too leni ent 
by a fac t or of 2 4 .  Both standards were very much higher than the 
1 93 8  standard . After a s truggle with the Supreme Cour t ,  OSHA 
promulgated the . 5  fibre standard as an "Emerge ncy Temporary 
Standard " effective November 4 ,  1 9 83 . See 7 8  Fed . Reg . 5 1 0 86 ( 4  
Nov . 1 9 83 ) . The da ta are summarized in the Fordham note . See 
also Treiger , Relief f2r. Asbestos Vic t ims : ! Legislat ive 
Analysis , 20 Harv . J ,  on Leg . 1 7 9 ,  1 92 - 96  ( 1 9 83 ) . Rich ard 
Epstein also argued that the asbe stos companies did not know the 
ful l extent of the asbestos risk . See Epstei n ,  supra note 5 .  
For a contrary view , see G lo t ta and Sherman , Learning From the 
Lessons o f  the Asbestos Traged y :  ! Reform Proposal , 1 9  Trial 6 8  
( 1 9 83 ) ( "Sufficient scienti fic i nformation exis ted no la ter than 
1 941 to avoid the ' asbe s tos trage dy ' " .  Id , at 7 0 ) . Two cases 
also hav e  affirmed jury verdic t s  imposing p unitive damages on 
asbestos companies . Mor an v. Johns-Manv il le Sales Corp . ,  6 91 
F . 2d 81 1 ( 6 th Cir . 1 9 82 ) ; Neal v .  Carey Canadian Mines , Ltd . , 5 4 8  
F .  Supp . 3 57 ( E .  D .  Pa . 1 9 82 ) . These cases erroneously equa te 
ful l information with knowledge that a product � be dangerous , 
apparently because they bel ieve it to be unpardo nable not to 
research ful l y  or warn searingly when one knows that ( an 
unspe ci fied amount of) harm migh t occur . This pape r ' s  argume nt 
is that such a bel ief is wrong . 
21 . Thi s  is the famous Sel ikoff study , which is de scribed in 
authori ties cited , supra note 2 0 . 
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22 . The difficul ties of testing for carcinogeni ty are wel l described 
in S .  Breyer , Regulation and Its Reform 1 3 5-41 ( 1 9 82 ) . 
23 . This analysis derives from Cal fee and Craswel l ,  Some Effects of 
Uncertainty On Compliance With Legal Standards , 7 0  Virg . L .  Rev . 
� ( 1 984) . A simil ar analysis is made in Cooter , Economic 
Analys is o f  Puni tive Damages , 56 U . S . C .  L .  Rev . 7 9  ( 1 9 82 ) . 
2 4 .  Professor Shavel l also points out that research into risk has a 
publ ic goods aspect , and concludes that when this aspect is 
impor tant , the Government should do much of the research . See 
Shavel l ,  Liability for Harm Versus Regulation o f  Safety,  1 3  J .  
Leg . Stud . 3 57 ( 1 9 84) . This view i s  correct ; the text argues 
only that a "negligenc e "  standard can amel iorate the publ ic goods 
problem , no t el imina te i t . 
2 4a .  If a firm can influence the probabi l i ty that a loss of given 
magni tude wil l occur wi thout also influencing that magni tude , 
purchasing insurance creates a moral hazard problem ; the firm is 
covered agai nst al l loss no matter how much care it take s , so it 
has an incentive to take l i t tle care . The moral hazard problem 
goes away if insur ance companies can moni tor care . 
2 5 .  See Keeton and Kwerel , Externalities in Automobile Insurance and 
the Underinsured Driver Prob lem , 27 J .  Law and Eco n .  1 49 ( 1 984) . 
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26 . The da ta are ambiguous be cause they do not ac count for people ' s  
risk perceptions . For example , if people underest imate the 
l iklihood that they wil l  injure others , they may buy too l i t tle 
insurance ; conversely , if they overest imate th is risk . Hence , it 
is di fficul t to isolate the contr i bution of "limi ted l iabi l ity" 
to people ' s  decision to insur e . That contribution is unl ike l y  to 
be zero , though . 
Results similar to those tha t Kee ton and Kwerel derive are 
found in Huberman , Mayers and Smi th , Opt imal Insurance Policy 
Indemnity Schedules , 1 4  Bel l J .  Eco n .  41 5 ( 1 9 83 ) . These authors 
cal l attention to the role of bankruptcy exemptions , which al low 
a person to retain subs tant ial tangible weal th--two cars and a 
house sometimes--though he decl ares bankruptcy . They then show 
that when the largest po ssible l iabi l i ty is h igh in relation to 
weal th , purch asing less than ful l insur ance though risking 
bankruptcy may generate greater expected utility than pay ing 
large insurance pr emiums . Scarcely any papers consider a 
corporation ' s  demand for insur ance . The only paper I have seen 
is Mayers and Smith , On the Corporate Demand for Insurance , 5 2  J .  
Busi ness 2 81 ( 1 982 )  • These authors a t tribute the demand for 
l iabil ity insurance to insurance company efficiencies in settl ing 
c laims and , rela tive to credi tors , in mo ni toring firm behavior . 
Respecting the last , a firm may retroactively lower its interest 
rate on loans by ado pting projects w i th a high risk of danger 
after th ey borrow . Interest rates will refl ect this po ssibil ity . 
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The existence of liabil ity insurance , however , signal s to lenders 
that i nsurance companies are moni toring to prevent such 
misbehav ior , and so keeps interest rates down . The difficulty 
here is that seemingly no way exists to specify how much 
i nsurance on activities that firms h ave yet to perform would 
consti tute an adequa te signal . Put more simply , Mayers and Smith 
do not address the question the text next take s up , which is how 
much insurance i s  it optimal for firms to buy . 
27 . When a firm is deciding whether to do a proj ect that wil l 
generate income in the future ,  it mus t  discount that income to 
present value to compare it with the present co sts of beginning 
the project . A firm ' s  "cost of capi tal "  is the discount rate i t  
uses . This rate increases with the project ' s  riskiness and the 
cost of mo ney general ly . 
2 8 .  The firm ' s  value in the text is computed by sol ving : 
I I +
---
� 
2 V = ( 1 + r ) ( 1  + r )  
w 
3 , where V = firm value . The( 1  + r )  
text gives only an approximate answer be cause , a s  the model in 
Part I I . A2 next shows , this formula is not exactly righ t . But on 
the text ' s  assumpti ons , that model also shows that the 
contempla ted firm would actual ly have a substantial nega tive 
value were i t  valued precisely .  
2 9 . O th er firms sometimes may operate without insurance . For 
example , in the famous case of Walkovsky v .  Carl ton , 223 N. E .  
2 3 6  ( N .  Y .  1 96 6 ) , an entrepreneur se t up separately incorporated 
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companies each of which had as i ts sole asse t two taxicabs ; these 
little companies then purchased the minimum insurance that the 
law al lowed . This resu l t  is unsurprising . Each "firm" had a 
relatively smal l amount of weal th at risk to victims--two cabs ; 
it could incur a l iabil ity wel l  in excess of this value ; and the 
income of two cabs isn ' t  large relative to the highest damage 
judgments th at could be rendered . In these circums tances ,  a firm 
may have an incentive to operate wi thout insurance . As Par t 
I I . A2 later shows , in these ci rcums tances cour ts also should 
pierce the corporate veil , to hol d the owner persona l ly liable . 
The New York Cour t did not do this , and so erred . 
3 0 .  The equa tion the text next gives is the sol ution to the problem 
of valuing the firm as an infini te series , in each year of which 
it wil l disappear with probabi l i ty p and continue for ano ther 
period wi th probabil ity ( 1-p ) . 
3 0a .  This paper discusses products that seldom can be made safer . In 
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warnings . The risk that a firm that issues a warni ng will bear L 
is thus not pL bu t p • p ' L ,  where p •  is the probabi l i ty that a 
court will find the firm ' s  warning to be inadequa te . If we l e t  
p • p '  = b and substi tute b f o r  p ,  t h e  analysis above goes 
through unaffec ted . For convenience , the text impl icitly 
suppo sed p '  to be one -- see assumption ( d )  above . If this 
assumpt ion is relaxed , firms then would be more like l y  to insure , 
for the likel ihood of insurance varies inversel y  with p and 
b { p .  When a firm can influence the safe ty of its product s , 
warnings seldom are excul patory , nor is care if strict l iabil ity 
obtains . In these ci rcums tance s ,  the test ' s  analysis goes 
through as wri t ten for nei ther warnings nor care are subs t i tutes 
for insurance ; hence , th e risk of incurring harm is pL . 
3 1 .  A very good analysis is Hal pern , Trebil cock and Turnbul l ,  An 
Economic Ana lysis o f  Limi ted Liability In Corporation Law , 7 0  U .  
o f  Toronto L .  J .  1 1 7  ( 1 9 80 ) . The authors ' treat l imited
a maj ority of jurisdict ions , a firm is held l iable for the 
liabi l i ty general ly , and do not consider products l iabil ity 
damages "unavoidably unsafe " produc t s  cause only if the firm 
probl ems . An early perception of the effect of l imited liabi l i ty 
in tor t  contexts is G .  Calabresi , The Costs of Accidents 
fails to warn adequatel y . Hence , for such products a warning and 
ful l  insurance are subs ti tutes . The possi bility that a firm 
could warn rather than insure does not affect the text ' s  
analysis . A warni ng is exculpa tory because it conveys ful l 
information . Since that is hard to do , firms that warn in fact 
face po si tive probabi lities that cour ts wil l not enforce their 
( 1 97 0 )  • 
3 2 . In a formal merger , the surviving enti ty is l iable for al l debt s ,  
including tor t  debt s ,  o f  the prede cessor corpor ations . When a 
company purch ases another company ' s  asse t s , the buyer is not 
ordinarily liable for the sel ler ' s  debts . The successor 
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liabil ity doctrine deal s with when the buyer is l iable for the 
se l ler ' s  torts . The literature and cases concerning successor 
l iabH ity are extensively summarized i n  Phil lips , Produ c t  Line 
Cont inuity and Successor Corporation Liability ,  5 8  N .  Y .  U .  L .
Rev . 906 ( 1 983 ) . See also , Jue nger and Schul man , Asset Sales and 
Produc ts Liability, 22 Wayne L .  Rev . 3 9  ( 1 97 5 ) . 
3 3 . See Henn and Alexander , Effec t o f  Corporate Dissolu t ion on 
Products Liability C laims , 56 C or n .  L .  Rev . 86 5 ( 1 97 1 ) . 
3 4 .  See authori ties cited supra note 3 2 .  
3 5 .  See author ities cited supra note 1 .  A recent opinion by Judge 
Posner suggests that cour ts may reconsider this rule . See In The 
Matter of UNR Indus tries , Inc . , 7 2 5  F . 2d . 1 1 1 1  ( 7 th Cir . , 1 984) . 
3 6 . See Kraakman , Corporate Liabi lity Strategies � the Costs of 
Lega� Controls , 93 Yal e L .  J .  857 , 86 8-7 6 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . 
3 7 . See S tone , The Place of Enterpr ize Liability in the Control o f  
Corporate Conduc t ,  90 Yale L .  J. 1 ,  6 9-7 9 ( 1 980 ) . 
3 8 .  For an effor t in this vein see Phil lip s ,  supra note 3 2 .  
3 9 .  Professor Roe recently argued that co ntingent tor t  claims should 
be assertable in bankruptcy to pr event firms from engaging in 
cer tai n forms of inefficient beh av ior . See Roe , supra note 3 .  
This proposal is not objectionable as regards knowabl e risks if 
these co nti 111gent claims are not dischargeabl e  i n  ful l  -- i f ,  that 
40 . 
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is , the firm is made to satisfy them to the ful l ext ent of its 
asse t s ; Roe also advoca tes this . But Roe ' s  proposal is unlikely 
to ach ieve its goal s i n  pr actice , whether i t  applies to risks 
that are knowabl e or remote . See text at notes 47-Sl , infra . 
The knowable delayed risk problem may be less serious than the 
text supposes because its emergence in a ful l equil ibrium 
framework seems improbable .  The analytical focus in such a 
framework is the marke t rather than the si ngl e firm . The text 
supposed a single firm that would operate for several periods , 
earn income and then vanish . If the firm were not a monopo l i s t , 
however , its rivals also woul d operate for several periods and 
vanish . The marke t for the relevant product then seemingly would 
have a se t of firms enter , operate , disappear and be replaced by 
a new se t of firms . Alterna tively ,  entry could take place a t  
different time s ; then firms would co ntinuously b e  entering t o  
earn prof its in the ac cident free years and exi ting when tho se 
years were up . Marke ts l ike th is apparently have not be en 
observed , and the latter form of behavior may no t be an 
equil ibrium in any event since the freque nt exi ts of harm-causing 
firms might al ert workers and consumers to the product ' s  actual 
riskiness . Thus , looki ng at marke ts rather than individual firms 
sugges t s  th at corpor ate structure may not be manipulated to 
externalize knowabl e delayed risks a t  al l .  This conclusion mus t  
b e  very tentatively hel d ,  however , because equil ibrium resul ts 
are risky to derive without doing the formal work . Hence , the 
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text argues that the law faces problems that are relatively easy 
to reso l ve even if firms would a ttempt to external ize knowable 
del ayed risks . 
41 . A mor e extensive treatment of the incentive of sh areholders to 
moni tor o ther shareholders i s  found in Hal pern , Trebilcock and 
Turnbul l ,  supra note 3 1 . 
42 . Judge Posner argued that abolish ing l imited l iabil ity would 
dampe n investment ince ntives ge neral ly . See Posne r , The Rights 
o f  Creditors of Affiliated C orporations , 43 U .  Chi . L .  Rev . 4 9 9
( 1 97 6 ) . The text argues that this dampe ning ince ntive will be 
exacerbated if cour ts impose remote risks on shareholders . 
43 . The existence of a bankruptcy option itse l f  is an incentive for 
insol vent firms to pur s ue i nefficient strategies such as those 
the text next describes . The behav ior of such firms is modeled 
in White , Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy : Me-Firs t and Other 
Priority Rules , 1 1  Bel l J .  Eco n .  S S O  ( 1 9 80 ) ; Bulow and Shoven , 
The Bankruptcy Dec ision , 9 Bel l J .  Eco n .  43 7 ( 1 97 8) . Impo sing 
remote risks is obj ectionable because it increases the se t of 
insol vent firms and strengthens their ince ntive to act 
inefficiently . This latter effect occurs because firms need not 
deal with future tort claimants while the firms that White , Bul ow 
and Shoven model had to deal with al l claimants on thei r weal th . 
Thus , everyone in their models who had an incentive to prevent or 
reduce inefficient behav ior actually bargained with the firm . 
9 8  
Respecting data about t h e  rel ationship be tween imposing r emote 
risks on firms and insolvency , the text suggested above that the 
asbestos compani es may no t have forseen the ful l extent of the 
asbestos risk . Professor MacAvoy recently stated that the 
asbestos companies and their insur ers would go bankrupt if they 
had to pay future claims at the rate the cour ts were making them 
pay current cl aims . See P The Economic Consequences of Asbestos 
Related Disease , 85-86 ( Jan . 1 9 82 ) ( Series C --Research Program 
in Government Busi ness Relati ons , Yal e School of Organization and 
Management , Working Paper #27 ) . 
44 . Respecting the text ' s  two il lustrations , for the first : Net 
present value = � + --1.Q2__ - � = -$2 8 . 83 . 
( 1 . 1 )  ( 1 . 1 ) 2 ( 1 . 1 ) 3 
For the se cond : 
Time 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Value of Yield 
.ts . ooo 
.t1 , ooo 
.t s ,  soo 
h . soo 
.t 10 , ooo 
NPV ( a t r = . 1 0) 
.t s . ooo 
.t 7 , 000/ 1 . 1 =2 $6 , 3 63 . 6 4  .t s . soo1 c 1 . 1 > 3 = $1 , 02 4 . 1 9.t 9 , S00/ ( 1 . 1 )  
4
= $7 , 1 42 . 86 
.t 1 0 , 000/ ( 1 . 1 )  = $6 , 84 9 . 3 2  
This il lustration i s  too simple because i t  le ts the firm treat 
futur e prices as certain and does not le t the discount rate vary 
wi th the firm ' s  choice of technology and extraction rate . In 
real ity , natural resource prices vary very wide l y  and the firm ' s  
discount rate is partly endogene ous . Adding these fac tor s , 
however , wil l not change the basic point , which is that an 
insolvent firm has an incentive to accelerate the extraction rate 
inefficiently . See Brennan and Schwartz , Evaluating Natural 
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Resource Investments , U .  B. C .  Working Paper ( 1 9 83 ) . The fil"lll , 
in theory , might sel l the righ t to mine coal in the third year 
for �7 . 1 42 . 86 thereby maximizing the value of the resour ce . 
Information asymme tries may impede such sales ; whil e coal is 
homogeneous , the fil"lll best knows its production function and 
therefore best knows the ne t yield . Also , outsiders may discount 
the price subs tantial ly because of uncertainty respecting future 
prices . Final l y ,  if al l fil"llls in an industry face a simil ar 
liabil ity , as in the asbestos case s ,  there may be no one to sel l  
to . 
4 5 . See Hanville Corp . Faces Increas ing Opposition to Bankruptcy 
f!.!ing, Wal l .  St . J, Jan . 3 1 ,  1 984 , P .  1 ,  Col . S . 
46 . Johns-Manville ' s  behavior is descri bed in Roe , supra note 3 .  The 
deadweight losses that occur in i nsol vency contexts when some 
cl aimants on a firm redistribu t e  weal th in thei r favor from other 
claimants may be mitigated when claims can be freely purch ased 
and recombined , for then i t  would reward an economic age nt to 
purchase all of the claims on a fil"lll and make economical ly 
efficient decisions on its behal f .  There i s  weak evide nce that 
this sometimes happens . See Baldwin and Maso n ,  The Resolution of 
C laims in Financ ial Distress : The Case of Hassey Ferguson , 3 8  J ,  
Fin .  S O S  ( 1 9 83 ) . The lack o f  a marke t for fut ure tor t claims and 
th e obvious difficulties in creating o ne imply that the 
deadweigh t losses the text describe s  wil l not be mitigated by 
such recontracting . 
47 . See Rowe , � note 3 .
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4 8 .  Valuing c laims o n  fil"llls i s  always complicated by the possibil ity 
of bankruptcy ; should bankruptcy occur , the value of a claim 
reduces t o  its value i n  bankruptcy , but this is hard to calculate 
!lX ante because it is hard to pr edict what a firm ' s  asse t to de bt
ratio wil l be when i t  becomes insolvent . See A .  Schwartz , 
Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities : A Review of 
Current Theories , 1 0  J .  Leg . Stud . 1 ,  2 4  ( 1 9 81 ) . This 
uncertainty shrinks substantial ly for current claims wh en 
bankruptcy actual ly occurs ; then debts and asse ts are at least 
roughly knowable . But uncertainty as to cl aim value may never 
shrink much for current and futur e claimants i f  future claims are 
provabl e in bankruptcy , because i t  is very difficult to ascertain 
th e number and value of claims that have not arise n .  
4 9 .  The conti ngent fee allows persons t o  transfer some of the 
li tigation risk to lawyers for a fee , but the l itigation risk for 
future claims seems too high to make it wor thwhile for po tential 
claimants to pay lawyers to take i t . 
so . Class acti ons can function to mitigate the public goods aspects
of litiga tion , bu t the diversi ties among pr esent asbestos 
claimants , for example ,  have so far prevented classes being 
certi fied for them . The difficul ty seems � fortiori for futur e 
1 01 
claims . The plainti ffs ' tor t bar conceivably could have 
sufficiently low coal ition costs and sufficiently homogeneous 
interests to mitigate some of the difficulties the text 
discusse s .  This se ems a r emote po ssibility , however . The issue 
here is not whether the state should permit future claimants to 
trigger bankrupt cies , an issue on which the tor t bar perhaps 
could lobby , but whether the future claimants of a parti cular 
firm wil l trigger its bankruptcy . Bar associ ations lobby but 
rarel y litigate individual cl aims . 
Sl . Roe , supra note 3 ,  argues that bo th futur e claimants and a public
agency should be authoriz ed to trigger bankruptcies but he does 
not consider the difficul ties raised here . In particular , he 
apparently believes that only future claimants whose claims have 
"a significant aggr ega te value " should be authorized to sue , but 
does not recogniz e  th at this r equi res a coal ition that is 
unl ikely to form . Also , he does not deal with the information 
problem that seemingly would prevent effective action by a publ ic 
agency . Roe , however , recognizes o ther difficul ties with his 
propo sals . He argues for them not because he bel ieves that they 
are perfect but because he bel ieves that future claims must be 
sa tisfied ; given this belief , he must find some way to satisfy 
th em . The difficul ties with his proposals and the extraordinary 
compl exity of th e compensa tion schemes he and o thers are driven 
to propo se suggest rather that the question whether to pay futur e  
claims should b e  regarded a s  ope n .  This paper begins with that 
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view , and Part III next argues that when the futur e claims arise 
from remote risks , they should not be impo sed o n  firms at al l .  
I f  th is view is accepted , whether and how these futur e cl aims can 
be asserted in bankruptcy are no longer questions . 
S 2 . The view that moral ity is derivable from ac cepted social rol es is 
Aristotelian . A modern version is A .  Macintyre , After Virtue 
( 1 9 81 ) . For a Humean version of the ide a ,  see Jones , Moral 
Obligations 1!nll Social Expectations : A Humean Reduc tion , 
Cal ifornia Insti tute of Technology Humani ties Working Paper #100 
( 1 9 84 ) . 
S3 . For exampl e ,  persons who smoke are approximately 6 0  times more 
likely than nonsmokers to become ill from asbestos exposur e .  
Hence , nonsmoking asbe stos workers , particularly i f  they use 
respirators , may be bearing acceptable risks . If so , asbestos 
could be viable with warnings . 
S 4 .  � . g . , Beshada v .  Johns-Hanville Corp . ,  90 N .  J .  1 91 , 4 47 A .  2d . 
43 9 ( 1 982 ) . 
S S . Professor Henderson argued that firms will spr ead the losses from 
difficul t to anticipate risks over products unrelated to those 
that caused injury , thereby misal locating resource s .  See 
Henderson , � with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 
69 Cal . L .  Rev . 91 9 ,  942-44 ( 1 9 81 ) . However , the l iability for 
such losses wil l not be reflected in price s at al l ,  as it does 
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not affect variable or fixed costs . Professor G .  Schwartz agrees 
that damages for unforeseen risks wil l  not be s pr ead , but 
seemingly bel ieves this is so because firms in a competitive 
industry operate where price equals cost , and so have no power to 
rai se price . See G. Schwartz , AY.R!:A note 5 ,  at 82 5 ,  n. 1 80 .
Such firms , though , would raise prices if marginal co sts rose ; 
for remote risk imposi tions they wil l not . 
56 . Professor Page recently argued that firms should bear remote 
risks because the law should protect " justifiable consumer 
expectations , "  and consumers can justi fiably expect always to buy 
safe products . Page , Generic Produc t � :  The � Agains t 
Comment l 1lP!l f2l: � IQr1 Liability , 5 8  N .  Y .  u . L .  Rev . 853 , 
8 8 9  ( 1 9 83 ) . Page begins with tbe standard manufacturing defect 
case , in which tbe firm knows the risk . If the firm marke ts a 
defective produc t  wi thout a warning , it make s "an impl ied 
representation of safety " ;  the effect of this representation is 
to "deprive th e consumer of the oppor tuni ty to evalua te the risk 
and to decide whether to accept i t . "  5 8  N. Y .  U. at 8 8 9  ( footnote 
omitted ) . The argwaent bas two aspects : ( a )  the consumers • 
expectations derive from the "implied r epresentation" ; ( b )  these 
expectations are " justifiable" because the normative goal is to 
induce manufacturers to make safe products or supply consumers 
with information so the consumers can protect themselves . Page 
then argues th at this analysis justifies manufacturer liabil ity 
when a product poses "an unknown or unknowable generic hazard " ;  
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there too , "an impl ied representation o f  safety" i s  made . ll! . 
The se cond aspect of Page ' s  argument fal ls for such products , 
however . Imposing l iability for remote risks nei ther increases 
safe ty nor warnings . Hence , even if consumers in fact always do 
expec t  products to be safe , tbey could not " justi fiably "  expect 
firms to assume remote risks . As Page himsel f recognizes , to 
make out a traditional exp e c tations argument , one must first show 
"which consumer expectations are justifiabl e" , and onl y  then ask 
what actual ly was expected . 5 8  N .  Y .  U .  at 8 87 . If consumer 
expectations run to firms rather than products , as the beginning 
of Part III suggested , one might claim that firms should bear 
remote risks because their commonly accepted social role is to 
make consumers whole for al l losses associated with the products 
the firms sel l .  But such a claim seems fal se in fac t . See note 
5 8 ,  !nf!:I.. 
57 . See Col eman , Horal Theories o f  Torts : Ihfil Scope !ml! Limits : 
flr1 I. 1 Law and Philosophy 3 7 1 , 3 7 4-7 5 ( 1 982 ) . Par t III B ( 2 ) 
later argues that a firm ' s  failure to dis cover a remote risk is 
in any event not morally cul pable .  See text a t  pp . 7 3-7 9 .  
5 8 .  This i s  what cour ts mean by the freque nt statements that 
manufacturers are not insurers and that tort liabil ity is 
sometimes strict bu t  never absolute .  
5 9 .  See J .  Rawls , A Theory of Jus tice ( 1 '7 1 ) . 
60 . M. at H .  
6 1 . lli· at 87 -88 . See also 3 04 .  
6 2 . This argument derives from B .  Barry . f.!!r. Division � �  
Justice ( in manuscript ) .
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63 . Professor Epstein seems first to have argued that tort law ' s  
function i s  t o  redress injur i es that others cause . See R .  
Epstei n ,  A �  2f. � Liability ,  2 J .  Legal Stud . 1 51 
( 1 97 3 ) ; R .  Epstein ,  Defenses .iru1 Subseauent Pleas !!! § System o f
Strict Liability , 3 J .  Leg . Stud . 1 6 5  ( 1 97 4) ; R .  Epstei n ,  
Intentional 1!1.r!!l:!.. 4 J .  Leg , Stu d .  3 91 .  The ful l argument is in
R .  Epstei n ,  A �  2f. � Liability :  � A  Refor1111lation 
2f. Tort .bu ( 1!180 ) . The standard critique is Borgo , Causal 
ParidiJtms In Tort 1&lf, 8 J .  Leg . Stud . 41 9 ( 1 97 9) , which agrees 
with Epstein that tor t law must require the existence of a causal 
linlc be tween injur er and victim, but argues that Epstei n ' s  causal 
notions are too primitive and his moral theory is insufficiently 
developed . The ful lest current statement of the compe nsatory 
justice aspect of tor t law is in a series of papers by Coleman . 
See J .  Coleman, M2W_ Theoriee of Torts : Their Scope and Limits : 
btl. 1. 1 Law and Philosophy 3 7 1  ( 1 982) ; Horal Theories of Torts : 
Their � JYll1 Limits : fill ll.. 2 Law and Philosophy 5 ( 1!183 ) : 
Coleman , Mental Abnormality , Personal Responsibility � Tort 
Liabi lity ,  i n  Mental Illness : Law and Publ ic Pol icy 1 07 ( B .  A .  
Brody and H .  Engelhardt , Jr . ,  eds . 1 980 ) . 
6 4 .  See , �.g. , Coleman , � note 63 . 
6 5 .  See H .  White , Founda tions of Historical Knowledge 1 06 ( 1 96 5 ) . 
6 6 . This sentence adopts the view of cause as a counterfactual . 
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We thinlc of a cause as something that makes a difference , 
and the difference it makes must be a difference from what 
would have happened without it . Had it been absent , its 
effects�some of them at least , and usual ly al l--would have 
bee n  absent as wel l .  
D .  Lewis , Causation ,  7 0  J .  Phil . 5 56 , 5 57 ( 1 97 3 ) . See also J .  
Mackie : The Cement of the Universe : A S tudy of Causation 64-6 5 
( 1 97 4) • 
67 . This account derives from J .  Mackie , � note 6 6 , at 61-6 4 .  
I ts clarifying force does not turn o n  whether i t  presuppose s a 
real ist view--the events and states of the world it describes are 
"real ly" there--or a Wit tgensteinien view--the notions of 
causation it  explains exist in our "life world";  rather , Mackie ' s  
account is useful seemingly independently of the ontology one 
adopts . See Putnam , � Causali ty Physical? , for thcoming Midwest 
Studies I n  Philosophy ( 1 984) . The notion or a causal field is 
necessary to distinguish causal from noncausal sequences . For 
exampl e ,  the text ' s  formal account permits birtb to be a cause of 
death because , had birth not occured , there woul d not have been 
the death at issue , yet no one explaining a death would choose 
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life as even a necessary cause . The distinction be tween events 
that are in a causal field and those that are in a minimal ly 
sufficient condition reflect s ,  according to Mackie , "our ordinary 
thinking about causal sequence s . "  it. at 3 6 . or course , what is 
background and what is a cause depends on what is  regarded as a 
"normal " state or att'aira : thi s  al lows a certain discretion to 
slip into a causal account because "normal " is a sl ippery term . 
Thia seldom leads to probleu . See Put nam ,  .!llll!.I:!. · 
6 8 .  See J .  L .  Macki e , � .irul Conditions , 2 4  American
Philosophical Quarterly 2 45 ( 1 96 5) . 
6 9 .  See Mackie , .!llU!J:!. note 6 6 , at 1 2 8-2 9 :  J ,  Feinberg , Doing and 
Deserving : Essays In The Theory or Responsibil ity 1 44-1 45 
( 1 97 1 ) . 
7 0 .  In 8enningsep �· 8loo•field �. lnsl. · · 3 2  N. J. 3 5 8 , 1 6 1  A .
2d . 6 9  ( 1 96 0 ) , the moat int'luential modern product s  l iabil ity 
case . the court said : 
Accordingl y ,  we hold that under modern marke ting conditions , 
when a llallut'acturer puts a new autC1111obile in the stream or 
trade and pr0110tea its purchase by the public , an 
[undisclaimable ]  implied warranty that it is reasonably 
suitable for use as such accompanies it into the hands of
the ul ti11ate purchaser . 
3 2  N .  J .  at 
_
, 161A . 2d a t See also Price v .  Shel l Oil , 2 
Cal . 3 d . 2 45 ,  2 5 8 ,  466 P .  2d 722 , 7 3 1  ( 1 97 0 ) . The Restatement 
version is : 
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[ T ] he sel ler b y  marke ting h i s  product for use and 
consumption , has undertaken and assumed a special 
responsibil ity toward any member of the consuming publ ic who 
may be injured by it . 
Comment to Restatement of Torts , Seco nd ,  Section 402A . Modern 
commentators tend to neglect such language because it seems 
concluaory and is difficul t  to explain ,  but it  actual ly is 
evidence for the view that compensatory justice notions were 
importantly responsible tor generating the strict l iability in 
tor t  doctrine . 
7 1 . See White , IJllU:A note 6 5 ,  at 1 1 9 .  For a similar theory of cause , 
see Feinberg , §!!RB note 6 9 ,  at 1 42-43 . 
7 2 .  See White , .!llU!J:!. note 6 5 ,  a t  1 22-23 . 
7 3 . See B .  Ackerman , Reconstruc ting Americap � ( 1 984) . 
7 4 .  Mackie states : 
Deliberate human actions are particularly rel evant as causes 
just because they are the focus or interest wi th respect to 
responsibil ity and various forms of control . 
Mackie , � note 66 , at 1 20 .
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7 5 .  Compare Epstei n ,  supra note 6 3 , with Landes and Posner , Causation 
In Tort Law : An Economic Approach ,  1 2  J .  Leg . Stu d .  1 0 9  ( 1 983 ) . 
See al so , in an earl ier incarnation , A .  Schwartz , Products
Liability filllt Judic ial Wealth Redistribution , Sl Ind . L .  J .  5 5 8 ,
S7 6 and n .  S 1  a t  S 81 ( 1 97 6 )  ( cr i ticising cases ) . Th e  text does
not suggest that one cannot have preferences over viewpoints . 
Ackte1"111an and I prefer the activist view , though his de scription 
of the reactive view seems overdrawn.  The text ' s  point rather is 
only th at many , including many judges , hold a reactive view , at 
least sometimes , so i t  is wor th seeing what that view impl ies . 
The existence of a causal link be tween the defendant ' s  
conduc t  and the plaintiff ' s  harm , i t  should be noted , is nei ther 
a sufficient nor a necessary condition for tort l iabi l i ty . I t  is 
not sufficient becau11e a defendan t  mus t  not only cause a harm ; he 
must cause it wrongfully . That a causal link is not necessary is 
il lustrated by th e successor l i abil i ty doctr ine . A succe ssor may 
be l iable fo� its predecessor ' s  tor t s ,  though it is very 
difficu l t  to argue that th e  succe ssor caused those torts . Cause 
i s  dispensed with if instrumental reasons exist to impose 
l iabi l ity . Hence , a eo11pensa tory justice theory does not explain 
al l or tor t law . Rather , the theory explains and justi fies many 
tor t law ou tcomes . I t  is unneccessary here to join the dispute 
about the comparative value of partial and ful l theories of civil 
l iabil i ty .  
7 6 .  Judi th Thompson recently co nflated noti ons or cause and 
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responsi bil ity , saying : 
If th e  defendant caused the harm , then ( o ther th ings bei ng  
equa l )  it is righ t that he be out o f  pocke t for the costs . 
Thompson , Remarks on Causation and Liability , 1 3  Phil . and Pub . 
Aff .  1 01 , 1 1 6 -1 7  ( 1 984) . Judges . however , distinguish be tween 
causation and responsi bil ity ( see text at notes 7 8-82 , infra ) , 
for , in the law ,  one is not responsible for every harm that one 
causes in fact . Thompson ' s  mistake l eads her into difficul ty . 
For exampl e ,  she does not want to hold a person l iable i f  the 
person caused a harm but took "al l due care • • • and • • • could
not have been expected to foresee [that her actions ] would lead 
to harm . "  I!! . at 1 1 1 . Yet she co ncedes her inabil ity to give a 
satisfactory moral account of this outcome . See id . at 1 1 4-l S .  
Such an account i s  possible once one real izes that legal 
liabil ity presupposes bo th causa tion and wrongful behavior . 
7 7 . Alan Donagan , for example ,  in The Theory of Moral ity ( 1 97 7 )
states that "It i s  impermissible t o  blame anybody for a n  action 
except as fal l ing under a description under which i t  is 
voluntary , that is , done knowingly • • • •  That i t  [ the action] 
falls under other descriptions is his good or bad for tune 
an agent is not answerable for his good or bad for tune . "  Ii!. a t  
1 21 , 1 26 .  Donagan derives this v i ew  from Judeo Christian 
morality , and it also is [ant ' s  positio n .  Recentl y , some 
ph ilosophers have attempted to work out a concept of "1110ral 
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luck " , in which a n  agent can assess the moral ity o f  his own 
actions in a nonutilitarian way by asking how those actions 
actual ly turned out . See B. Wil liama , Moral Luck 20-3 9 ( 1 9 81 ) ; 
T . Nagel , Mor tal Questions 2 4-3 8 ( 1 97 9) . These effor ts seem to 
•e to be incoherent and •istaken and , in any event , their authors
apparently do not regard them as especial ly helpful to people who 
want to assess o ther actors rather than themselves . See 
Wil liaa , lmll:I.• at 3 6-3 7 . 
7 8 .  90 N .  J .  1 91 .  447 A2d 53 9 ( 1 9 82 ) . 
1 9 .  90 N .  J .  at 
_
. 447 A .  2d at 5 47 ( emphasis added ) .
80 . This causal story is compl icated i n  a way that is wor th 
mentioning but ,  on current knowledge , not worth pursuing 
seriousl1 . Let c1 and c2 each be sufficient causes of an event
e .  For example ,  c1 is "1 shot I" and c 2 is "Z poisoned I " ;  the
event e is  Y ' s death , which ei ther c1 or c2 could produce . I n  
t h e  event , 1 shot I three hours before Z meant to poison her . 
The difficulty results because the text defined cause 
countertactual lf , but a countertactual account is inappl icable to
the il lustration.  The statement : "If the worl d  bad run on from 
just before c 1 happened and c1 had not have h appened , e would not
have happened" is false . Had t be world run o n ,  e would have 
happened because c2 would ; that is , Z would have poi soned Y .
Thus , al though c 1  happened and so e did (1 shot Y ,  who died ) , the
statement "C1 ( counterfactual ly) caused e" is fal se . This
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difficulty is referred to as "preemptive causation , "  and i t  put s  
a serious strain on the notion o f  cause as a counterfactual . See 
J .  Elater , Explaining Technical Change 3 4  ( 1 9 83 ) . Preemptive 
causa tion is relevant here because a person who smokes is sixty 
times more l ikely to get cancer after being exposed to asbestos 
than one who does not . This suggests that a significant subse t 
of "asbestos victims" might have got cancer anyway . So if c1 is 
asbestos exposur e ,  c2 is smoking and e is lung cancer , in some 
oases e would have happene d  though c1 bad not . And it may be 
tha t  other such unrelated susceptibil ities to disease exist 
respecting many toxic substance s .  Bu t  the n ,  what notion o f  cause 
permits one to say that the manufactur er ' s  act of exposing 
persons to asbestos causes cancer? An unconv incing r efutation or 
this difficul ty is Lewis , .IBlJU'.A note 6 6  at 5 6 7 . I do not want to
pursue the problem here for two reasons . Firs t , preemptive 
causation applies to relations among particular causal events and 
outcomes . The se t of nonsmokers who go t cancer after being 
exposed to asbestos seemingly is not empty , nor , for al l we know , 
is the se t of smokers who would not have go tten cancer bad they 
instead worked in chocolate factories . Hence , there exist real 
world causal chai ns ,  perhaps many of them , to which the
preemptive causation obj ection does not appl f .  A counterfactual 
causal account illumina tes them . Seco nd , this paper ' s  subj ect is 
liabi l i ty ,  not causa tion itsel f ;  and the text next argues that 
liabi l i ty should not lie though causa tion exists .  I t  then is 
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unnecessary t o  pursue causal difficul ties such as this i n  de tail . 
81 . 90 N .  J .  at _, 4 47 ! ,  2d at !5 47 . 
82 . The court bel ieved that to impose unknowabl e risks on firms would 
increase safety and facil i tate loss spreading .  
Gary Schwartz recently argued that what the cour ts mean when 
they use the term strict l iability in design defect and warning 
contexts is more akin to negligence in that defendants are held 
l iable only i f  they fal l bel ow some l egal ly de termined standard 
defining the appropriate design or warni ng . G .  Schwartz , � 
Vitality 2f. Negligence lrul � � of Strict Liability ,  1 !5  Ga . 
L .  Rev . 963 ( 1 9 81 ) , And Jules Coleman claims that a rule which
holds a person liable because he respo nsibly caused harm is 
actual ly a rule that makes liabil ity turn on faul t ;  such 
l iability cannot be strict . See Coleman , Horal Theories of 
Torts : Their � ifilSl Limits : � 1_, 1 Law and Philosophy
3 7 1 , 3 80  ( 1 9 82 ) . Thus the argument in Part III may actual ly 
concern a negl igence system .  It uses the term strict l iability 
because the cour ts use it and it seems more famil iar . 
83 .  Most of the bil ls now before Congress to compensa te asbestos 
victims are of this type , See , �.g. , H .  R. !57 3 !5 ,  97 th Cong . 2d . 
Sea s .  ( 1 9112 ) ; H .  R .  !5224 . 97 th Cong . 1 s t  Ses s . ( 1 981 ) . One bil l 
makes the victim ' s  remedy nonexclusive and has no cap on damages , 
but also exculpa tes firms if "the release [of the substance ] was 
not the result of a fai l ure of the defendant to exercise due care 
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with respect to the hazardous substance concerned i n  l ight o f  al l 
rel evant facts and circumstances . "  H .  R .  7 3 00 ,  97 th cong . 2d . 
Seas . ( 1 982 ) , 1 01 ( c )  ( 2) . This section invites , if it does not 
require , courts to impose only knowable risks on firms . 
